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FROM THE EDITOR 
Carlos Alberto Sánchez 
SAN JOSE STATE UNIVERSITY 
Although the present issue of the newsletter is not 
arranged around a singular theme—something we have 
done in the past—the issue is, nonetheless, a special issue. 
Included here is the winner of the 2016 APA’s Essay Prize in 
Latin American Thought, L. Sebastian Purcell; two papers 
by contemporary Mexican philosophers, Mario Teodoro 
Ramírez and Manuel Bolom Pale, writing on Luis Villoro 
and Indigenous Tsotsil philosophy, respectively; and, more 
relevant to our current political situation, three discussion 
pieces by three established members of the Hispanic/ 
Latinx philosophical community in the U.S., José-Antonio 
Orosco, Susana Nuccetelli, and José Jorge Mendoza. 
We begin with our discussion pieces: in the first, José-
Antonio Orosco reflects on what the election of Donald J. 
Trump to the presidency of the United States means for us. 
In the second, Susana Nuccetelli argues against the Trump 
administration’s vow to repeal the Affordable Care Act 
(a.k.a., Obamacare). She writes that “no morally acceptable 
reason” can justify the repeal. In the final discussion piece, 
José Jorge Mendoza reflects on the future of Whiteness 
in American democracy in the context of the election of 
Donald Trump. He argues that, unlike the common opinion, 
and as the 2016 election showed, Whiteness will figure out 
a way to coopt certain sectors of the Latinx electorate so as 
to preserve its supremacy. 
While the current political landscape might provoke its 
fair share of existential dread, especially amongst us 
Hispanics/Latinx, it’s safe to say that we will continue 
with the important work of diversifying and enriching the 
philosophical curriculum for future generations. A case 
in point is Sebastian Purcell’s prize-winning essay, which 
places Aztec philosophy in a very fruitful conversation 
with Aristotle. Sebastian Purcell considers the Aztec 
conception of the good life, neltiliztli. According to Purcell, 
“like Aristotelian eudaimonia or ‘flourishing,’ the Aztec 
understanding of neltiliztli functioned to justify concerns 
about action guidance, and so was conceptually prior to 
an account of the right. Unlike the Aristotelian conception, 
however, they did not hold that there was an internal 
relation between pleasure and the good life, understood 
as neltiliztli. The implications suggest that the Aztecs had a 
sort of virtue ethics, which has so far gone unrecognized in 
any study of Aztec philosophy.” 
Deepening our connection to the Mexican indigenous 
philosophical tradition, the essay by Manuel Bolom Pale, 
translated here for the first time, introduces the concept 
of Tsotsil epistemology. Bolom Pale, himself Maya tostsil
from the region of Chiapas, defines and explains certain 
terms in Tsotsil cultural life that seek to capture significant 
philosophical insights. These insights, in turn, are meant to 
structure Tsotsil cultural, religious, and political life while, 
simultaneously, serving as guides for the construction of 
Tsotsil subjectivity. 
From Michoacán, Mario Teodoro Ramírez gives us an
authoritative philosophical portrait of the great Mexican
philosopher Luis Villoro. Ramírez, who oversees the
Institute of Philosophical Investigations “Luis Villoro” at the
Universidad Michoacána San Nicolas, accesses the vast
archive at his disposal to provide an outline of Villoro’s many
and significant contributions to philosophy, ethics, and
politics. This essay is also translated here for the first time.
In the final paper, Django Runyan reflects on Leopoldo 
Zea’s connections to the Greeks, to the origins of 
philosophy itself. Runyan finds in Zea a deep appreciation 
of philosophy’s roots and an almost obsessive impulse to 
return to those roots. 
In all, the present issue of the newsletter aims both to 
connect us to the immediacy of our current social anxieties 
(in the Discussion section) and to remind us about the 
important work yet to be done in the history of our own 
philosophy. That is, it exemplifies those two impulses 
that characterize our calling as Latinx philosophers in the 
Americas: the impulse to advocate and be activists for 
causes that matter to our community, and the impulse for 
rigorous research into our own traditions. 
CALLS FOR SUBMISSIONS 
2017 ESSAY PRIZE IN LATIN AMERICAN THOUGHT 
The APA Committee on Hispanics cordially invites 
submissions for the 2017 Essay Prize in Latin American 
Thought, which is awarded to the author of the best 
unpublished, English-language, philosophical essay in Latin 
American philosophy/thought. The purpose of this prize is 
to encourage fruitful work in this area. Eligible essays must 
contain original arguments and broach philosophical topics 
clearly related to the specific experiences of Hispanic 
Americans and Latinos. The winning essay will be published 
in this newsletter. 
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A cash prize accompanies the award along with the 
opportunity to present the prize-winning essay at an 
upcoming divisional meeting. Information regarding 
submissions can be found at http://www.apaonline. 
org/?latin_american. Please consider submitting your work 
and encourage colleagues or students to do the same. Feel 
free to pass this information along to anyone who may be 
interested. The submission deadline is June 5, 2017. 
The committee is also soliciting papers or panel suggestions 
for next year’s APA three divisional meetings. The deadline 
for APA Eastern meeting committee session requests is 
rapidly approaching, so please send any ideas to Grant 
Silva (grant.silva@marquette.edu), who will relay these 
suggestions to the rest of the committee. 
FALL 2017 NEWSLETTER
The APA Newsletter on Hispanic/Latino Issues in Philosophy 
is accepting contributions for the fall 2017 issue. Our 
readers are encouraged to submit original work on any topic 
related to Hispanic/Latino thought, broadly construed. We 
publish original, scholarly treatments, as well as reflections, 
book reviews, and interviews. Please prepare articles for 
anonymous review. 
All submissions should be accompanied by a short 
biographical summary of the author. Electronic submissions 
are preferred. All submissions should be limited to 5,000 
words (twenty double-spaced pages) and must follow 
the APA guidelines for gender-neutral language and The 
Chicago Manual of Style formatting. All articles submitted 
to the newsletter undergo anonymous review by members 
of the Committee on Hispanics. 
BOOK REVIEWS 
Book reviews in any area of Hispanic/Latino philosophy, 
broadly construed, are welcome. Submissions should 
be accompanied by a short biographical summary of the 
author. Book reviews may be short (500 words) or long 
(1,500 words). Electronic submissions are preferred. 
DEADLINES 
Deadline for spring issue is November 15. Authors should 
expect a decision by January 15. Deadline for the fall issue 
is April 15. Authors should expect a decision by June 15. 
Please send all articles, book reviews, queries, comments, 
or suggestions electronically to the editor, 
Carlos Alberto Sánchez, at carlos.sanchez@sjsu.edu, 
or by post: Department of Philosophy 
San Jose State University 
One Washington Sq. 
San Jose, CA 95192-0096 
FORMATTING GUIDELINES 
The APA Newsletters adhere to The Chicago Manual of 
Style. Use as little formatting as possible. Details like page 
numbers, headers, footers, and columns will be added 
later. Use tabs instead of multiple spaces for indenting. 
Use italics instead of underlining. Use an “em dash” (—) 
instead of a double hyphen (--). Use endnotes instead of 
footnotes. Examples of proper endnote style: John Rawls, 
A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1971), 90. See Sally Haslanger, “Gender and Race: (What) 
Are They? (What) Do We Want Them to Be?” Noûs 34 (2000): 
31–55. 
DISCUSSION 
The Solace of Mexican Philosophy in the 
Age of Trump 
José-Antonio Orosco 
OREGON STATE UNIVERSITY 
In Mexico Profundo, or Deep Mexico, Mexican 
anthropologist Guillermo Bonfil Batalla argued that the 
lives and experiences of ordinary Mexicans living in rural 
areas and poor urban neighborhoods in Mexican cities 
continue to be rooted in Mesoamerican civilizations. Their 
understandings of work, community obligation, health, 
time, and harmonious coexistence, he maintained, form 
a connection to indigenous folkways that go back to pre-
Columbian societies. Most Mexicans may not recognize 
these habits, or themselves, as indigenous, especially 
since the Mexican state has gone to great lengths to “de-
Indianize” Mexican national identity.1 But the everyday 
experiences of many Mexican people are shaped by these 
much older cultures and practices lying deep underneath 
the modern ways of life. 
I was thinking about Mexican thinkers such as Bonfil, as 
well as other Mexican philosophers, when I walked to 
the university the day after the Trump electoral victory. 
My first appointment that day was with a Chicanx student 
who explained, in an emotionally tired voice, that she 
had been up all night with her parents who were trying to 
determine what sorts of work they might be able to find 
if they were deported back to Mexico. I saw some of my 
colleagues in the hallways and later learned that a few of 
them had broken down crying in front of their classes. A 
Muslim student, later in the day, told me he had been on 
the phone with friends all night, gauging their fear; one of 
them admitted to him that calls to suicide hotlines were 
overwhelming some centers in the area and they were 
having to put people on hold. After my class on Latin 
American philosophy in the afternoon, an African-American 
student came to my office and admitted he was deeply 
worried about what his younger sibling was going to do 
growing up in this environment. Throughout the whole day, 
my social media feeds filled up with friends expressing 
amazement, disgust, and the feeling that they did not 
understand their country anymore. 
The work of José Vasconcelos helped me not to be shocked. 
In his 1925 work The Cosmic Race, he described what he 
considered to be the main cultural differences between 
North and Latin America—the profound U.S. and the 
profound Latin America, particularly Mexico. He argued if 
you wanted to understand the modern history of these two 
Americas, you have to go back and look at the differences 
in their modes of settler colonialism. These formative 
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experiences created deep grooves and patterns into the 
culture and political development of the two societies that 
continue to shape the habits and practices of modern life. 
In North America, according to Vasconcelos, the white 
settlers envisioned the continent as a utopia for themselves, 
a place to venerate the accomplishments of English 
culture, and proceeded to exclude or exterminate nonwhite 
populations. In the North you found “the confessed or tacit 
intention of cleaning the earth of Indians, Mongolians [sic], 
or Blacks, for the greater glory and fortune of the Whites.”2 
This vision of white utopia propelled the extension of the 
United States all the way across the West. It also grounded 
legislation that excluded Asians from immigrating or from 
most civic life in places like California, propped up the 
Jim Crow segregation in the South, and the Juan Crow 
segregation in the Southwest that Vasconcelos directly 
experienced while he attended high school in Eagle Pass, 
Texas. He surmised: “The English kept on mixing only with 
the whites and annihilated the natives. Even today, they 
continue to annihilate them in a sordid and economic fight, 
more efficient yet than armed conquest.”3 
Terrance MacMullan’s work, Habits of Whiteness, 
corroborates Vasconcelos’s view that North American white 
supremacy originates in the colonial experience of the 
United States.4 MacMullan points to the Bacon Rebellion 
of 1676 as the catalyst moment in which Europeans started 
to think of themselves as “white” with special privileges in 
civil society. When poor frontier farmers revolted against 
the landed plantation gentry, the latter responded by 
promulgating new laws that established a white identity 
and limited the liberties of those classified as non-white, 
namely, Native Americans and Africans. Thus, the richer 
plantation owners were able to reduce dissatisfaction with 
their regime by convincing the poorer farmers and white 
indentured servants that they all actually formed a natural 
community of interest around their racial identity and that 
African slaves and Native Americans were the real threats 
to their well-being. 
For Vasconcelos, what distinguished Latin America 
from the Northern settler colonialism was the way in 
which racial integration and miscegenation had become 
more acceptable in Spanish society. White supremacy 
still reigned, but the particular features of social and 
political life made the development of a variety of mixed 
racial identities possible (indeed, during the Spanish 
and Portuguese colonial period, places like Mexico and 
Brazil recognized hundreds of possible racial identities 
and combinations).5 Founding figures in Latin American 
independence during the nineteenth century, from Simón
Bolívar and José Morelos, all recognized that Latin American 
republics would have to contend with multi-racial identity 
and the abolition of race-based slavery and caste in order 
to succeed and be stable.6 Vasconcelos did not believe that 
race-based discrimination had been eliminated in Latin 
America, but merely that the image of a white utopia never 
took root as deeply as it did in the North. 
What made me think of Vasconcelos in the context of the 
Trump victory is that he identified white supremacy as part 
of the profound United States—that is, as part of the deep 
tendencies that lie underneath modern society in North 
America. According to Vasconcelos, the United States has 
learned very well how to develop over time the practices 
and institutional policies of exclusion, marginalization, and 
eradication of non-white peoples; these are the ready-to­
hand tools that are reached for in moments of fear and 
crisis for white Americans. 
Trump’s campaign reached deep into los estadounidos 
profundo—the deep white supremacist toolbox. Voting data 
reveals that, overwhelmingly, a majority of white people— 
men and women, rural and suburban, educated and non-
educated alike—felt called to defend a society that Trump 
described as under attack by Mexicans, Muslims, and 
urban Blacks. Despite his misogyny and promises to undo 
reproductive rights, most white women felt summoned to 
protect that deep United States vision now in ways they did 
not just eight or even four years ago when they turned out 
for a Black president. This is not to say that all white people, 
or even the majority of white people who voted for Trump, 
have particular racial animus toward non-white people. 
I think what Vasconcelos would say is that these voters 
heeded the dogwhistle of white supremacy—the appeal to 
return to center and to keep menacing peoples at bay— 
that lies deep in U.S. culture and is turned on when times 
are uncertain in order to solidify a certain power base. 
And it is this part of Vasconcelos’s analysis that keeps me 
from paralyzing despair. It means that what happened with 
the Trump victory should not be understood as something 
new, something unexpected, or strangely out of place. 
It is something profoundly American. That doesn’t mean 
it isn’t something to worry about, and that some groups 
shouldn’t now worry about their safety and security; but 
it is a reaction that has happened time and time again in 
U.S. history from the very beginning of our founding. To 
think that the habits of whiteness were eradicated with a 
decade-long Civil Rights movement and that eight years of 
a Black president have ushered us into a post-racial society 
is to naïvely underestimate los estadounidos profundo. 
Vasconcelos offered a way forward. The Cosmic Race is 
an attempt to sketch an alternative to the white utopia of 
the United States: a cosmopolitan world in which our racial 
categories would no longer work because there would be 
so much interbreeding that the ordinary person would be 
profoundly mixed. It would be a place in which each person 
would see a part of themselves in others, racially speaking, 
and parts of others in themselves. Racism would become 
an irrational kind of self-hatred. The new religion of such 
a community would be based in faith that emphasized 
love and compassion for one another. The politics would 
be socialist—a world in which everyone had an ability 
to participate in decisions, and goods are distributed 
according to need. 
There are many problems with Vasconcelos’s utopia of 
the Cosmic Race. The history and politics of racial mixing 
in Mexico and the rest of Latin American is fraught with 
lingering effects of racism toward indigenous and African 
populations. Vasconcelos glosses over these events in order 
to sharpen his contrast between North and Latin America. 
And he doesn’t offer very much in terms of institution 
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building—beyond hand waving at love and socialism, he 
doesn’t say much about what kinds of structures need to 
be put in place to build a world that stands up to the power 
of the white supremacist utopia. 
But what Vasconcelos aspires to is thinking about the history 
and politics of race in the Americas in order to develop 
radical alternatives and possibilities, ones that respect and 
esteem the kind of racial mixing that was despised, and 
even made illegal in the United States in 1925. He wanted 
to imagine a utopia of elation, erotic attraction, and passion 
in which people would “feel towards the world an emotion 
so intense that the movement of things adopts rhythms of 
joy.”7 I think he calls on us not to despair in the face of 
white supremacy with its fears, stupidity, and its ugliness, 
but to envision a beautiful world of playful togetherness 
and sympathy amid our differences as we struggle for a 
better world of social justice. Indeed, this kind of attitude 
is one that motivates the social and political philosophy 
of several Latin American theorists, including Ignacio 
Ellecuria, with his notion of “fiesta” as an alternative to 
capitalist consumerism, and Graciela Hierro’s conception 
of “pleasure” as an alternative to the patriarchal fascination 
with control and death.8 
Vasconcelos’s project reminds us that social organizing 
is not just a dry, practical matter of political pragmatism. 
Radical imagining, writing, and theory building is also 
organizing work that makes another world possible. As the 
science fiction author Ursula K. LeGuin said upon her being 
awarded the National Book Award in 2014: “Hard times are 
coming, when we’ll be wanting the voices of writers who 
can see alternatives to how we life now, can see through our 
fear stricken society and its obsessive technologies to other 
ways of being and even imagine real grounds for hope. . . 
. We live in capitalism, its power seems inescapable—but 
then, so did the divine right of kinds. Any human power can 
be resisted and changed by human beings. Resistance and 
change often begin in art. Very often in our art, the arts of 
words.”9 
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Repealing Obamacare: An Injustice to 
Hispanics 
Susana Nuccetelli 
ST. CLOUD STATE UNIVERSITY 
On January 13, 2017, the Republican-controlled House of 
Representatives approved by a 227–196 vote the formation 
of committees charged with preparing legislation to 
repeal the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (PPACA), in a move regarded as the first step in one 
of Donald Trump’s key policies during his presidential 
campaign. In spite of grand language to the contrary, as 
shown here, the move targets those PPACA mandates that 
have broadened access to a decent minimum of health 
care, mostly for individuals from low socioeconomic status 
and/or underrepresented groups, including Hispanics. 
I argue that no morally acceptable reason can justify the 
narrowing of health-care benefits for these groups. 
SOME FACTS ABOUT OBAMACARE AND HEALTH­
CARE COVERAGE FOR HISPANICS IN THE U.S. 
Medicine is increasingly making possible services for 
which there is great demand but also limited availability 
and high cost. Under these circumstances, the moral 
question of what counts as a fair distribution of health­
care resources is particularly pressing for societies with the 
means to provide access to “a decent minimum” coverage 
for all. Many countries, including some in the developing 
world, do provide such access for their residents. They 
include most European countries as well as Australia, 
Canada, Cuba, Japan, New Zealand, South Africa, and 
Taiwan. Their approaches to financing and organizing 
universal access vary from a single-payer system of health 
care administered by a health authority and funded by 
taxes (in, e.g., Australia, Britain, and Canada) to multi-
payer systems (in, e.g., Germany, the Netherlands, and 
Switzerland). By contrast, the U.S. long stood alone among 
developed nations in failing to ensure a decent minimum 
of health care for its residents. Only in 2010 did it conform 
to the emerging standard among industrialized nations by 
adopting a multi-payer system with the enactment of the 
PPACA, known informally as “Obamacare” or “ACA.” Initially, 
some ACA critics charged that it was unconstitutional, but 
that objection was largely put to rest in 2012 by the U.S. 
Supreme Court. Yet the public debate over health-care 
reform in the U.S. continued beyond 2010, as shown by 
the House’s resolution designed to repeal some of its 
provisions. Although it is still unclear which ones are being 
targeted, “radical” ACA mandates include that 
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1)	 Every (authorized) resident must either be insured 
or pay a special tax. 
2)	 Exchanges to buy insurance, in part subsidized, 
are made available. 
3)	 Medicaid, an existing insurance program for 
economically disadvantaged workers that is 
funded from both federal and state sources, is 
expanded. 
4)	 Insurers remove annual and lifetime caps on 
coverage, offer coverage to all, eliminating 
discrimination on the basis of age, sex, or pre­
existing condition, and eliminate some co-pays on 
services such as preventive screening and reduce 
other co-pays. 
5)	 Employers either “play or pay.” 
These provisions have expanded significantly the number 
of people with health coverage in the United States. By 
2014, the number of uninsured residents in America had 
fallen about 5 percent, according to the RAND Corporation, 
the Commonwealth Fund, the Gallup Poll, and the Urban 
Institute.1 As a result of the ACA, about 20 million people 
gained health coverage, a considerable number given 
that in 2010 there were 50 million uninsured in the U.S.2 
According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, the ACA’s impact on Hispanics is evident: 
•	 Approximately 8 in 10 gained access to a decent 
minimum of health care because of the ACA 
mandates (2) and (3) above—together with the 
Children’s Health Insurance Plan. 
•	 Four million adults gained health-care coverage 
•	 The uninsured rate dropped 11.3 percent (from 
41.8 percent to 30.5 percent) 
•	 About 35 percent of Hispanic patients relying 
on Community Health Centers for their health 
care gained access to them because of the ACA 
investment of $11 billion in those centers.3 
True, the number of uninsured Hispanics went from 29 
percent in 2013 to 40 percent in 2016, at a rate higher than 
any other underrepresented group.4 But since unauthorized 
immigrants, among whom Hispanics are more numerous 
proportionally, are included in these numbers, the data 
only points to the injustice of providing access to a decent 
minimum of health care only to authorized residents—a 
flaw affecting many systems of universal coverage.5 As a 
result, the data does not undermine the conclusion that the 
ACA amounted to moral progress given the reasons to be 
considered next. 
FAIR EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY AND THE
RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE 
An influential account of moral obligation in bioethics
contends that people have a positive right to health
care. Accordingly, society has a duty to provide universal
coverage, and that duty may be defeated or overridden
only by (i) more stringent moral obligations, such as
other obligations of justice or respect for persons; or
(ii) practical considerations concerning society’s means,
whether financial or technical. In Norman Daniels’s Fair
Equality of Opportunity account, this conclusion follows
directly from the application of Rawls’s principles of
justice to health care.6 Roughly, according to Rawls, when
bargaining behind the veil of ignorance about society’s
basic structure, the contractors would choose to distribute
primary social goods fairly for the self-advancement of all
individuals. Among the sets of such goods is “freedom
of movement and choice of occupations against a
background of diverse opportunities.” Daniels regards
health care as derivative from this set of goods because
of the special value of health. People who have, as a result
of injury or disease, lost “species-normal functioning”
are deprived of a Fair Equality of Opportunity for self­
advancement.7 Physical and mental impairments reduce
individual opportunity relative to what’s normal range
of opportunity for members of the species. Given this
account, the following argument supports a right to health
care for all: 
1)	 If justice in health care requires protecting fair 
equality of opportunity, then there is a right to 
health care for all. 
2)	 Justice in health care does require protecting fair 
equality of opportunity. 
3)	 Therefore, there is a right to health care for all. 
This right may, however, be overridden when society lacks 
the appropriate resources.8 But affluent nations such as 
the U.S. do have the means, and therefore, the prima facie
obligation to promote fairness of opportunity by taking the 
steps necessary for prevention and treatment of disease 
for all. Since, as shown by the above list of facts, the ACA 
is a step in that direction; therefore, unless the current plan 
to repeal it comes without an appropriate replacement, it 
should be condemned as a moral injustice. 
A PLURALISTIC GROUND FOR THE ACA 
Furthermore, the moral obligation to provide universal 
access to a decent minimum of health care may exist even 
if there is no right to health care. On Allen E. Buchanan’s 
Pluralistic Account, since the category of human rights 
is a contested one in political theory, a more plausible 
strategy for universal access relies on multiple reasons. 
First, affluent societies must provide such coverage for 
all because they owe compensation to the victims of 
past wrongdoing. Historic injustice creates a duty of 
reparation to make fair restitution to victims. In the U.S., 
the grievances of racial and ethnic minorities and other 
underrepresented groups justify the provision of a decent 
minimum of care for all as a fair restitution. Second, some 
prudential considerations support the same claim: they 
concern emergency room costs for uninsured people from 
low-income groups, and the consequences for labor force’s 
productivity (and defense personnel’s fitness) of lacking 
appropriate care. Third, humanitarian reasons concerning 
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avoidance and prevention of harm recommend access to a 
decent minimum of health care for all. 
LIBERTARIAN PRINCIPLES FOR REPEALING THE
ACA 
Rawlsian and Pluralistic accounts suggest that limiting 
access to a decent minimum of health care on the basis 
of income or racial and ethnic identity is a serious moral 
injustice. What moral reasons, if any, might justify the 
current plan to repeal the ACA? Bioethicist H. Tristam 
Engelhardt, Jr., for example, has invoked libertarian 
principles to argue that “A basic human secular moral 
right to health care does not exist—not even to a ‘decent 
minimum of health care’.”9 After all, in order to fund health­
care coverage for all, the government would have to use 
its coercive power for collecting and redistributing the 
needed financial resources. But that violates people’s 
negative rights to liberty and property, for it requires the 
government to (i) coercively take their property through 
taxation, and (ii) regulate a health-care system, thereby 
limiting individual free choice in health care. From the 
libertarian perspective, this is a deeply unjust arrangement 
that conflicts with a free-market system of health care 
where services are delivered according to ability to pay, 
through the private, voluntary purchase of insurance by 
individuals or groups. In fact, libertarians often emphasize 
the difference between negative and positive rights, 
doubting the very existence of positive rights and arguing 
that only negative rights have correlative duties, because 
they are easily fulfilled just by doing nothing. But such 
claims are misleading since it is not exactly true that 
duties of forbearance are easier to fulfill. At the very least, 
they require governments to keep criminal law systems, 
revenue services, police departments, military forces, and 
other protective branches. Other libertarian objections to 
the ACA focus on its failure in securing (i) consumer choice, 
(ii) quality care, and (iii) cost containment. Yet objection (i) 
is weak because the ACA does not render private financing 
of extra levels of health care incompatible with universal 
access to a decent minimum for all: those who have the 
means to purchase extra levels can do so. Objections (ii) 
and (iii) are empirical claims that remain unconfirmed by 
data gathered so far. In fact, a close look at the annual 
averages of health-care costs per capita in Canada and the 
U.S. since 2010 does point to the superiority of Canada’s 
system,10 which is not exactly what those seeking the ACA 
repeal have in mind. In the absence of better arguments 
justifying such a repeal, I submit that any restrictions to 
the already limited scope of the ACA amounts to a serious 
injustice that should be condemned on moral grounds.11 
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Latinx and the Future of Whiteness in 
American Democracy 
José Jorge Mendoza 
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INTRODUCTION
For Americans on the left of the political spectrum, there 
are not many positive takeaways from the 2016 presidential 
election. However, one potential silver lining could be the 
dramatic increase in the Latinx vote. This increase gave 
Hillary Clinton a rather easy victory in Nevada, a state that 
many pundits had considered a toss-up going into Election 
Day, and made usually solid republican states, such as 
Arizona and Georgia, a lot more competitive than they 
had been in recent elections. The increase in the Latinx 
vote is also the reason Clinton was able to hold on to the 
state of Virginia, a state which on election night was much 
closer than polls had predicted. Those of us on the left of 
the political spectrum might be tempted to take comfort 
in this and might even tell ourselves that despite the 
disappointing result, the future of progressive politics in 
America remains bright and this is in no small part thanks 
to the browning of America. 
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At one level this makes a lot of sense. Latinx are the fastest 
growing minority group in the United States, so much so 
that by around 2050 it is estimated that Latinx will comprise 
almost a quarter of the U.S. population. This will make Latinx 
not only the largest minority group in the U.S., but also the 
driving force behind the U.S. becoming a minority-majority 
country. In other words, it is estimated that by around 2050 
the U.S. will be a country in which more than 50 percent 
of its citizenry will be nonwhite.1 The leadership in both 
the Republican and Democratic parties agree that this 
change in demographics could forever alter the American 
political landscape. This is because Republican candidates 
rarely get above 30 percent of any minority group’s vote 
and this lack of appeal among minority groups has made 
Republican politicians accustomed to winning elections by 
capturing a sizeable majority of the majority (i.e., winning 
55 percent or more of the white vote). Given the oncoming 
demographic changes, which will be driven primarily by 
the growing Latinx community, it would stand to reason 
that Republican candidates will find it increasingly difficult 
to continue their current electoral strategy and expect to 
win national elections. 
In this respect, the state of Florida might seem like a 
strange outlier. Ever since the infamous 2000 presidential 
election, Florida has been a very closely contested state 
and this year was no different. Back in 2000, Latino/as made 
up approximately one sixth (15 percent) of that state’s 
population. Sixteen years and four presidential elections 
later, Latino/as now comprise almost a quarter (25 percent) 
of the state’s population. Given what was just outlined 
above, it should stand to reason that in this year’s election 
Florida should have been a fairly reliable Democratic 
state. Instead, Donald Trump carried the state by nearly 
two percentage points! So is the case of Florida merely 
a hiccup in the forward march of progressive American 
politics, or does it actually foretell something else? In this 
essay I want to suggest, following the work of critical race 
theorists such as Ian Hany López and Derrick Bell, that 
Florida is not an aberration but instead provides us with 
an underappreciated insight into American “whiteness” 
that should trouble progressives who optimistically believe 
that we are merely living through the final throes of white 
supremacy. 
Whiteness, as most race theorists have noted, is neither 
fixed, essential, nor bounded. In other words, whiteness 
can and does change depending on context. We also know 
from past experience that in order to obtain or maintain 
a dominant position—even and especially in democratic 
political communities—whites have resorted to either 
eliminating (e.g., genocide) or isolating (e.g., apartheid and 
segregation) any threatening non-white group(s). There is 
no doubt that these sorts of strategies continue in the U.S. 
today, as is evident from everything from calls for stricter 
immigration enforcement focused primarily on keeping 
certain kinds of immigrants out, to the gerrymandering 
of congressional districts and voter ID laws whose real 
aim is to suppress or dilute the non-white vote. What is 
less discussed, however, is a third strategy that can and 
has been deployed when these other two strategies 
have proven insufficient. When a sizeable majority of the 
majority in a multi-racial democracy is no longer enough to 
guarantee electoral victory, that majority group (in this case 
whites) have also historically shown themselves amenable 
to expanding the boundaries of whiteness and coopting key 
segments of the non-white population. By “key” segments 
here I do not mean most or even many, but just enough 
nonwhites and only those whose inclusion into whiteness 
would require the least amount of change or dilution. 
What I am suggesting in this essay is that Trump’s election, 
and especially his win in a state like Florida, is in fact 
signaling a change in American whiteness but not the kind 
of change that some progressives might have been hoping 
for.2 What the results of this past election seem to show 
is that certain segments of the Latinx population (e.g., 
the Cuban community in Florida3) are and will continue 
to be coopted into whiteness. To be clear, this offer to be 
included into whiteness is not open to all Latinx, but to just 
enough to both keep whites as a perpetual majority and 
only to those Latinx whose inclusion would require the least 
amount of change or dilution to our current conception 
of whiteness. In other words, a state like Florida is not so 
much an aberration or outlier in our current political climate 
as it is a harbinger of American whiteness to come and of 
Latinx role in it. 
SPACE TRADERS REVISITED 
Recently, Ian Haney López has popularized the phrase 
“dog-whistle politics.”4 This phrase refers to a strategy for 
winning democratic elections in societies with a large white 
majority. The underlying premise of dog-whistle politics is 
that most whites are still willing to vote, oftentimes even 
against their own better economic interests, for candidates 
that affirm their fears, anxieties, and prejudices about 
nonwhites. Given the political climate in the U.S., where at 
least since the end of Civil Rights Movement racist, nativist, 
and even xenophobic appeals have been considered 
politically out-of-bounds, candidates have had to signal their 
sympathy for white supremacy in more coded language. In 
an anonymous interview given in 1981, Republican Party 
strategist Lee Atwater infamously outlined how this coded 
appeal to white voters worked for Richard Nixon in his 1968 
presidential campaign, a campaign whose methods have 
come to be collectively known as the “Southern Strategy.” 
You start in 1954 by saying “Nigger, nigger, nigger.” 
By 1968 you can’t say “Nigger.” That hurts you. It 
backfires. So you say stuff like forced busing, states 
rights and all that stuff and you get so abstract. 
Now you talk about cutting taxes and these things 
you’re talking about are totally economic things 
and a byproduct of them is, blacks get hurt worse 
than whites. And subconsciously maybe that’s 
part of it. I’m not saying that. But I’m saying that 
if it is getting that abstract and that coded, we are 
doing away with the racial problem one way or the 
other. Obviously sitting around saying we want to 
cut taxes and we want this, is a lot more abstract 
than even the busing thing and a hell of a lot more 
abstract than nigger nigger.5 
Haney López’s principle claim is that despite Barack 
Obama’s electoral victory in 2008 and his subsequent 
reelection in 2012, dog-whistle politics remain alive and 
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well in American politics. Nowhere is this claim more 
evident than in Donald Trump’s recent election—where 
Trump blew the dog whistle so loudly that his racist 
message became audible to even the most racially tone-
deaf of Republicans like Mitt Romney. The result of this 
was that Trump won almost 58 percent of the white vote, 
but in turn lost nearly 75 percent of the non-white vote— 
an outcome that is consistent with traditional uses of dog 
whistle politics. Despite the pommeling Trump took among 
non-white voters, Trump was still able to win the election 
because nonwhites comprised only about 25 percent of 
the electorate. In other words, Trump could afford to lose a 
super-majority of the non-white vote because a substantial 
(although not necessarily super) majority of the white vote 
was still enough to win a national election in the U.S. The 
effectiveness of dog-whistle politics is not only clear to 
those of us on the political left, but has also been clear to 
many on the far-right who for years have openly implored 
Republican candidates to use this strategy more.6 
Even if all of this is true, would it not also follow that as 
nonwhites become a larger percentage of the electorate— 
as is expected to happen in the near future, thanks largely 
to the growing number of Latinx—the less likely it will 
be that dog-whistle politics will remain effective and, in 
fact, might backfire and come to haunt the Republican 
party for decades?7 Furthermore, is this not also what 
most reasonable Republicans (i.e., the non-far-right 
conservatives) also believe and why so many of them have 
been so dismayed with the recent Trump phenomenon?8 
The short answer to these sorts of questions is yes, but 
only if we assume that American whiteness in 2050 will 
look the same as it does today. I want to suggest that we 
have good reasons to believe that this assumption will not 
hold up. Instead, I believe that for the foreseeable future 
white supremacy will continue to play the pivotal role it has 
been playing in American politics, and it will do so because 
of (and not in spite of) the changing nature of American 
whiteness. This is a conclusion that I think is not only 
consistent with but also follows naturally from the work of 
renowned legal scholar Derrick Bell.9 
In perhaps his most well-known work, “The Space Traders,” 
Bell poignantly articulates both his “permanence of racism” 
and “interest convergence” theories.10 In this piece, Bell 
recounts a science-fiction story about visitors from outer 
space that come to Earth and offer the American people 
marvelous gifts which will solve most of their pressing 
domestic concerns in exchange for every Black American. 
In the story the majority of Americans accept this bargain 
with the space traders and once again show themselves 
willing to sacrifice the lives of Blacks when it is in their best 
interests to do so—despite their professed abhorrence of 
racism. 
The point Bell is trying to make with this story is that the 
view most of us have of “racial progress” in the U.S. can 
be a dangerous illusion. It can lull us—especially us good 
progressives—into thinking that racial justice in America has 
a forward bent to it, which can at times be slowed but never 
stopped. Bell does not necessarily deny that in some ways 
things have gotten better for Blacks in America. Slavery, 
after all, is abolished and segregation is no longer legally 
permissible. Still, he wants to emphasize that racism is a 
permanent feature of U.S. society (i.e., not an aberration) 
and that what might look like forward progress has really 
been just a collection of historical moments where the 
interests of a significant number of whites just happened 
to converge with those of Blacks. The concessions that 
Blacks have been granted with the help of a majority of 
white Americans (e.g., Civil Rights legislation) has been the 
result not of moral persuasion (i.e., not out of the better 
selves of whites) but because of interest convergence 
(e.g., when Jim Crow segregation became a liability in 
the context of the Cold War). When those interests are no 
longer aligned, when they diverge as they do in the story 
of the Space Traders, whites have and will continue to take 
those concessions back and then some. 
The Space Traders story, with its underlining themes about 
the permanence of racism and interest convergence theory, 
can help us understand what happened with states like 
Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania. The simple truth 
of the matter is that Clinton lost the election because she 
could not hold on to these three usually reliable Democratic 
states. These states were considered so “in the bag” that 
she hardly campaigned in those states. Some pundits have 
argued that the tipping point in those states, the white 
working class that has traditionally voted Democratic, voted 
for Trump this time around because they had grown tired of 
how the new globalized economy was negatively impacting 
them. Most of these voters have come to believe that both 
Democrats and Republicans are committed to promoting 
the kinds of trade policies that have driven down their 
wages and, in many cases, eliminated their jobs altogether. 
A vote for Trump represented for them a break with the 
current status quo and a harkening back to better days.11 In 
other words, their vote for Trump was motivated more by 
economic fears than by a desire for white supremacy. 
To a large degree I think that something like this account 
is ultimately correct, and I don’t mean to downplay these 
causes or to claim that most working-class whites are racists. 
But let us also remember that in the Space Trader story, 
most whites who voted to make the trade were not living in 
the best of circumstances nor were they necessarily racist 
either. Bell’s point is that they made the trade not so much 
because they hated Blacks, but because of what the aliens 
promised to give in return. Trump, much like the aliens, 
promised to “make America great again,” and it makes 
sense why this appeals to many good-hearted people. The 
problem is that there is an underside to this bargain, which 
someone has to pay for. Trump promised to make places 
like Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania great again, 
but only in exchange for further ostracizing nonwhites. It 
is a very small consolation to nonwhites that most of the 
white working-class who voted for Trump might have been 
repulsed rather than attracted by his racism. The only thing 
that really matters is that they went ahead and made the 
trade anyway. When their interests no longer aligned with 
those of nonwhites, no amount of moral exhortations were 
strong enough to get them to vote against white supremacy. 
Let us now retell the Space Traders story, except this 
time let us imagine that it is 2050 and that demographic 
changes have occurred as they have been predicted to 
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occur. America is now a minority-majority country and the 
visitors from space ask Americans to sacrifice all nonwhites 
in exchange for marvelous gifts that will solve their most 
pressing domestic problems. Keep in mind that in this 
scenario, members of groups who in 2016 were considered 
nonwhite (e.g., Black, Asian, Latin, Middle Eastern, and 
Native Americans) now collectively outnumber members 
of the group that in 2016 would have been considered 
white. It would seem reasonable to predict today, taking a 
good progressive view about the future, that in 2050 there 
would not be the numbers to make such a trade—in fact, 
nonwhites could probably band together and make a trade 
in exchange for whites. 
This hopeful view of the future, however, rests on the 
assumption that whiteness in 2050 will look a lot like it does 
today. This is an assumption that I find faulty for at least 
two reasons. First, American whiteness was not the same 
in 1950 as it was in 1850, so why assume that it will look 
the same in 2050? Second, Latinx are not a homogenous 
racial bloc and if given the opportunity, many Latinx would 
probably jump at the chance of being white.12 If this is 
so, then there is good reason to be suspicious that mere 
demographic changes will be enough to ensure that in the 
future nonwhites no longer get “space traded” by whites. 
AMERICAN WHITENESS 
American whiteness and American democracy have always 
been closely aligned. This history can be traced all the way 
back to the initial exclusion of Blacks and Native Americans 
from U.S. citizenship and thereby the vote. It also extends 
to the various efforts that were and continue to be made 
to suppress their vote even after they were granted U.S. 
citizenship. Similarly, Asians for a long time were denied 
the opportunity to become naturalized U.S. citizens 
because from 1790 until 1943, naturalized U.S. citizenship 
was reserved exclusively for whites. So while Black, Asian, 
and Native Americans have historically been the exemplars 
of non-whiteness in the U.S., American whiteness has itself 
never been a definitive or fixed concept. For a long time, 
American whiteness was reserved exclusively for people of 
Northern European descent and even then only to certain 
segments of Northern Europe, so Irish and Polish were 
initially denied full white status. 
The worry that U.S. elections might be decided contrary to 
the will of the majority of whites began to arise sometime 
in the mid-1800s—well before Blacks, Asians, or Native 
Americans could become citizens—and it led to the creation 
of the now infamous Know-Nothing Party. The majority of 
people who joined the Know-Nothing party did not come 
from very wealthy or elite backgrounds. In fact, a lot like 
the populist movements we see today, its members came 
largely from lower- and working-class backgrounds. The 
platform of this party was based around nativism and, in 
particular, an opposition to Catholic immigration. The worry 
about Catholic immigrants was that they were coming in 
droves and were bringing with them a subversive religion. 
The fear was that Catholics planned to have as many 
children as they could in order to eventually have the 
numbers necessary to vote in a government that would be 
more loyal to the Vatican than to the U.S. constitution. 
For this reason, the modus operandi of the Know-Nothing 
Party was to do everything in its power to prevent Catholics 
(which came to be associated with both Irish and “Latin” 
European immigrants) from obtaining any political post 
and also deny them jobs, arguing that American business 
owners had a patriotic duty to employ only true Americans. 
They were also certain that Catholics were already trying 
to rig elections by having non-citizens vote. Know-Nothing 
activists would therefore stand watch at polling stations 
during elections, and this would often lead to violent 
confrontations. 
By the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of 
the twentieth, the worry about Northern Europeans losing 
their majority status went from a fringe conspiracy theory 
to a mainstream crisis. This concern was exemplified in 
the writings of people like Madison Grant, who in 1916 
wrote the widely influential book The Passing of the Great 
Race. In that book Grant argued that the founding race of 
the United States, the Nordic race, was heading towards 
extinction because of various factors, none of which was 
more pressing than the continued immigration of inferior 
races into the United States, especially of the Alpine (i.e., 
Eastern Europeans) and Mediterranean (i.e., Southern 
Europe) races.13 
The initial reaction to this threat was to try to keep out 
non-Northern Europeans through immigration restrictions. 
This was the reason U.S. immigration policy was radically 
changed in 1924, adding quotas for the first time on Southern 
and Eastern European immigrants. This, however, did not 
solve the supposed problem. Immigration from Southern 
and Eastern Europe continued at a much higher rate than 
immigration from Northern Europe. Eventually, the solution 
that was settled upon was to expand the notion of American 
whiteness and include Southern and Eastern Europeans, 
who at least were closer to embodying American whiteness 
than Blacks, Asians, or Native Americans (as a kind of aside, 
it is also around this time that Arabs came to be legally 
classified as “white” in the United States14). 
The usual reason cited for how and why Southern and 
Eastern Europeans came to be included in American 
whiteness is the advent of World War II. As the story goes, 
the utter hypocrisy of morally condemning fascists who 
held a similar racial ideology as we did, coupled with 
the need for a united American front to fight European 
fascism, provided to be too much. American whiteness had 
to be expanded, and this project of expanding American 
whiteness was not much of a secret. It was made explicit 
in projects that we can still see today, such as the award 
winning short film The House I Live In. In that film, Frank 
Sinatra stars as himself and makes the case to a group 
of multi-ethnic young boys (all of whom we would today 
consider white) that they should not let their differences 
in religion or nationality divide them because at the end 
of the day they were all Americans who stood up against 
everything fascism represents. By the end of WWII various 
immigration reforms were passed, removing various 
immigration restrictions and adopting instead policies that 
put Southern and Eastern Europeans on par with Northern 
Europeans. 
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The result was that by 1950, American whiteness was no 
longer what it had been in 1850. If whiteness had not 
undergone this change, America would have already 
been considered a minority-majority country. In fact, this 
is what gets covered over in the assimilationist claim that 
America has always been a “nation of immigrants.” A claim 
that for most of its history was, in fact, used as a derisive 
slur about oncoming demographic changes.15 The fact is 
that American whiteness changed and while this change 
had dramatic effects that reshuffled the electoral map, the 
basic structure of American democracy—where a sizable 
majority of the white majority was sufficient to carry the 
day—remained the same. In a way, Latinx might today be 
playing a similar role as Southern and Eastern Europeans 
did in the early part of the twentieth century. Even as their 
continued migration is currently decried, thirty years from 
now certain segments of the Latinx population might 
seamlessly come to be seen as just another part of the 
white melting pot. 
CONCLUSION 
In short, it’s not clear that changing demographics alone 
will be enough to sever the link between white supremacy 
and American democracy. White supremacy has shown that 
it is not only willing to resort to the elimination and isolation 
of nonwhites, but that it is also willing to expand and recruit 
from certain segments of the non-white population if that 
is what is necessary for it to maintain its dominant position. 
By doing so it will ensure that political decisions continue 
to be made by a significant majority of the majority and, 
even more troubling, that dog-whistle politics will remain 
an effective political tool for the foreseeable future. 
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ESSAYS 
Eudaimonia and Neltiliztli: Aristotle and 
the Aztecs on the Good Life1 
L. Sebastian Purcell 
STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT CORTLAND
1. EUDAIMONIA AND NELTILIZTLI 
How shall we live? What sort of life would it be best to
lead? Does that life entail obligations to other people? If
so, which? These, briefly, are the questions at the heart of
ethical philosophy. The first two, concerning the best sort of
life, address the topic of the good. The latter, concerning our
obligations to others, address the right. Among many of the
philosophers of classical Greek antiquity, including Plato and
Aristotle, questions concerning the good were understood
to be conceptually prior to those of the right. They held, in
short, that one needed to know what kind of life one sought
to lead before one could raise questions about what sorts
of obligations followed. The best life, they maintained, was
the happy or flourishing one—a life of eudaimonia.2 They
considered, moreover, the skillful leading of such a life to be
a virtuous one, and that is why this form of ethics has been
called a eudaemonist virtue ethics. 
What the present essay argues is that the pre-Columbian 
Aztecs, or more properly the Nahuas, the people who spoke 
Nahuatl in pre-Columbian Mesoamerica, held a view about 
ethical philosophy that is similar to Aristotle’s. They held to 
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a conception of the good life, which they called neltiliztli,
and they maintained that understanding its character was 
conceptually prior to questions about rightness. What this 
thesis suggests is that they also held to a form of virtue 
ethics, though one different from the eudaemonist sort 
that Aristotle and Plato championed. Since neltiliztli means 
rootedness, one might call it a rooted virtue ethics. 
One consequence of this thesis is that it articulates an
alternative understanding of the good life which, while
similar to Aristotle’s eudaimonia in the way it guides our
thinking about right action, raises a new problem for ethical
philosophy: Just how closely linked is pleasure (hēdonē) to
the good life? There is a similarity here with the fundamental
ethical problem of classical antiquity, which asked whether
virtue was sufficient for happiness (eudaimonia). Yet the
focus of the present problem centers not on virtue’s relation
to the good life, but on just what counts as a good life in
the first place. Can one really have a conception of the good
life that does not have any internal relation to elevated or
positive emotional states (hēdonē)? The Nahuas would have
us believe that we can and must, at least for any life led on
what they called our “slippery” earth. 
A second consequence is that this essay makes some strides 
in filling a gap in comparative philosophy. The Nahuas are 
finally beginning to receive philosophic attention among 
Anglophone scholars, but this work has so far tended to 
focus on their metaphysical views.3 This is generally true 
even among Spanish-speaking scholars, who have been 
better in addressing the Nahuas philosophically.4 The 
present essay, then, moves some direction in developing 
our understanding of Nahua philosophy by articulating their 
conception of the good life.5 Since the matter at hand is 
rather complicated, I begin with the features of eudaimonia
and neltiliztli as the highest end. 
2. THE HIGHEST END 
There are two key features of the good life which have 
a reasonable parallel in Aztec and Aristotelian thought, 
namely, that the good life is the highest end of action, and 
that this highest end may be spelled out by its relation to 
the human condition. On this last point, however, Aristotle 
differs somewhat from the Aztec approach since he relates 
eudaimonia to the human function (ergon), while the Aztecs 
draw their reasoning from a wider characterization of what 
life is like on our earth, on what they called tlalticpac. 
Aristotle begins the Nicomachean Ethics (N.E.) rather (in) 
famously by making a case for the good as the highest or 
ultimate aim of our actions as follows: 
Every art and every inquiry, and similarly, every 
action [praxis] and every decision [proairēsis] is 
thought to aim at some good; hence men have 
expressed themselves well in declaring the good 
to be that at which all things aim. But there appears 
to be a difference among the ends; for some are 
activities, others are products apart from [the 
activities which produce] them.6 
The quality of the reasoning at stake in this passage has 
been the source of scholarly controversy. Just because 
every inquiry, action, and decision aim at some good, it 
does not follow that the good is that at which all things 
aim. This would be a little like arguing that all roads lead 
somewhere, so all roads lead to the same place. Piecing 
together what Aristotle intended, then, has occupied 
scholars for some time. 
With respect to the controversy, briefly, it seems that two 
points clarify what Aristotle had in mind. First, recall that 
Aristotle’s method for ethics is to find “a view [that] will 
be most in harmony with the phenomena.”7 To do this, he 
begins from a piece of reputable wisdom, an endoxa,8 and 
then proceeds to tease through possible implications to 
arrive at a better statement.9 In this case the endoxa is the 
statement: “hence men have expressed themselves well 
in declaring the good to be that at which all things aim.” 
What the rest of the passage is meant to do, even if it is 
not fully complete, is to bridge the gap between the first 
observation, as a premise, and the endoxa, as a conclusion. 
In brief, the argument he develops runs thus: 
[1]	 If the goods of each (inquiry, action, etc.) are 
hierarchically ordered (and they are), 
[2]	 And if goods do not go on to infinity (which would 
be absurd), 
[3] Then there is a highest good. 
The conclusion, [3], is the highest good at which “all” things 
aim in the opening line.10 
Since Aristotle, a little later, identifies the highest good with 
eudaimonia, what the opening argument suggests is that 
the good life is that sense of happiness that emerges when 
one considers one’s life as a whole, when one considers 
the ordered relation among one’s goals and hierarchizes 
them.11 While a variety of commentators have noted that 
Aristotle does not quite complete this argument in the 
opening passages of the N.E., they tend to agree that this 
is the sort of argument he intends to make.12 If that is so, 
the real difficulty is not the quality of the inference from 
the premises to the conclusion but the soundness of [1]. It 
is not clear that all of our goods are hierarchically ordered. 
Aristotle makes his argument by analogy to the sciences, 
and while it is true that they may be hierarchized, individual 
human aims often are not. Aristotle even acknowledges this 
much in accounting for the different sorts of pleasures that 
are sought.13 It turns out, then, that some sort of skill will 
be necessary to manage this relation—and this, in brief, 
is the purpose of the virtues: those excellent qualities of 
character than enable a person to live her life well. 
Still, there is disagreement concerning just what that 
highest end should be, and in the first book of the N.E., 
Aristotle proposes to settle the matter by appealing to the 
proper activity or function (ergon) of human beings. He 
writes: 
If, indeed, the function of humans is the soul’s 
performance according to reason, or not without 
reason, and if we acknowledge that the function 
of an individual is also that of a good individual 
in a generic way, just as is the case with a lyre 
player and a good lyre player, and so on for all the 
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others without qualification . . . if it is thus, then 
the human good would be the soul’s performance 
according to virtue, and if there are many virtues, 
according to the best and most complete.14 
Given the way that Aristotle loads in premises to his 
argument, mostly here marked by ellipses, it is not 
surprising that the grounds for his claim have also been 
the subject of some rather intense philosophic scrutiny. 
The core of his reasoning, without addressing much of the 
metaphysical backdrop behind it, appears to turn on the 
thesis that to be is to be good. Expressed differently, he 
holds that to be a thing of a certain kind, say a lyre player 
or a bicycle, or whatever else, is to be a good lyre player, 
or a good bicycle, or a good anything else.15 For example, 
if my bicycle were to be damaged, so that its wheel were 
bent slightly, it would ride poorly. As a result, it would be 
a worse bicycle. If the bicycle were to lose its chain, then 
it would resemble something closer to a scooter. Were it 
to lose its wheels altogether, then it would cease to be a 
bicycle and would, rather, be only a bicycle frame. What 
goes for bicycles, other objects, and practices also goes 
for humans. The human function is to make use of reason, 
understood in a broad sense (i.e., as logos). Activities, 
insofar as they are properly human, thus make use of logos. 
To be a good human, by the same reasoning, is thus to 
be one who leads a life by means of logos, or at least not 
without it. To the extent that one fails to use logos, one 
leads a bad or vicious human life. 
In sum, the good human life is the one which exhibits human 
excellences or virtues. The bad one is that which exhibits 
human vices. Since this understanding articulates (some 
of) what it means to lead a human life at all, it establishes 
a basic set of conditions for our highest human aim, for 
eudaimonia. We are obligated to pursue it, if we should 
seek to lead a human life at all. This argument settles the 
dispute concerning happiness by establishing objective 
conditions for all human pursuits. Finally, and to connect 
these points to one of Aristotle’s arguments in Book 10 of 
the N.E., it is only by pursuing this sort of life that we can 
enjoy human pleasures at all. 
For the Nahuas, just as for Aristotle, it is the human 
condition that limits and enables one to pursue the 
best sort of life. Unlike Aristotle, for the Nahuas it is the 
character of our circumstances as humans on earth that 
primarily determines this condition, not a property of what 
we are as animal beings, like logos. For the Nahuas, our 
lives are ones led on earth, on tlalticpac. This place has 
three pertinent characteristics which set the conditions 
for the sort of life that we can hope to lead. It is, first of 
all, a slippery place. This point is amply recorded in extant 
Nahua texts. For example, the sixth volume of Florentine 
Codex (F.C.) has a catalogue of common sayings. There we 
read the following one: 
Slippery, slick is the earth. 
It is the same as the one mentioned 
Perhaps at one time one was of good 
life; later he fell into some wrong, as if 
he had slipped in the mud.16 
The “one mentioned” is the saying which is listed just 
above in the codex, which reads: 
How is this? Look well to thyself, thou fish of gold. 
It is said at this time: if one some 
time ago lived a good life [and] later 
fell onto some [other one]—perhaps he took 
a paramour, or he knocked someone 
down so that he took sick or even died; 
and for that he was thrust into jail: 
so at that time it is said: “How is this? 
Look well to thyself, thou fish of gold.”17 
A few observations are in order. A first is that the range 
of things that are slippery (tlaalahui) includes the sorts of 
actions that we might commonly include in the ethical, 
because they are under our volition, and those that 
are not, because we have little or no control over them. 
We would say that taking a paramour is a choice, while 
knocking someone over, by tripping for example, is a bad 
outcome, but pardonable because out of our control. Yet 
these are descriptions of our condition on earth, and their 
point seems to be that regardless of individual choice, 
this is just the sort of place where we can expect these 
lapses. We may have to go to jail as a result, so that appeal 
to the condition of tlalticpac is not exculpatory, but it is 
descriptive of the general character of our human lives. A 
second point is that the slipperiness of tlalticpac, then, is 
not something that one can hope to avoid by reasoning 
well. One does not slip through an Aristotelian hamartia, an 
error in the practical syllogism of one’s reasoning.18 Rather, 
this is just the sort of place in which one is prone to slip, 
where lapses in judgment will occur. The ideal for one’s 
life, as a result (and third), cannot be one that includes no 
errors, no lapses in judgment. Purity in this place cannot 
be the goal after which we strive asymptotically. Rather, it 
must be the sort of ideal that recognizes that these slips 
occur, and yet manages them as well as possible. 
A second feature of our human condition, life on tlalticpac, is
that it is transitory. Again, this point of view is well attested in
extant texts, yet no one is a better spokesman on this point
than Nezahualcoyotl. In a work of poetic philosophy entitled
“Ma zan moquetzacan, nicnihuan! / My friends, stand up!” he
writes the following (this is the piece in its entirety). 
My friends, stand up! 
The princes have become destitute, 
I am Nezahualcoyotl, 
I am a Singer, 
head of macaw. 
Grasp your flowers and your fan. 
With them go out to dance! 
You are my child, 
you are Yoyontzin. 
Take your chocolate, 
flower of the cacao tree, 
may you drink all of it! 
Do the dance, 
do the song! 
Not here is our house, 
not here do we live, 
you also will have to go away.19 
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The character of this piece cannot but strike one as of a 
similar character as 1 Corinthians 15:32, “Let us eat and 
drink, for tomorrow we die.” Still, the context is much 
wider in Nahua thought. For Nezahualcoyotl, in fact, this 
is the basic problem of our existence (and not merely the 
slipperiness of our lives). For not only is it true that our 
lives are ephemeral, but it is also the case that even the 
structure of the cosmos is ephemeral in character. The fifth 
age, the one with a sun of motion, is one which, like the 
previous four, will sometime pass. 
These considerations lead one to the third feature of life
on tlalticpac, namely, that it is far from clear that it is a
happy place. As part of an extended poem, Nezahualcoyotl
writes: 
Is it true that we are happy, 
that we live on earth? 
It is not certain that we live 
and have come on earth to be happy. 
We are all sorely lacking. 
Is there any who does not suffer 
here, next to the people?20 
For Nezahualcoyotl’s own work these considerations led 
him to seek the only sort of stability and eternity for which 
one can hope, namely, that to be found in philosophical-
poetic reflection, in the composition of “flower and song.” 
For the Nahua’s broader ethical outlook (more below), 
these reflections supply the reason why the pursuit of 
happiness is not something that they thought could be a 
suitable objective for one’s life’s plan. The transitory and 
slippery character of life on tlalticpac would make elevated 
emotional states, i.e., “happiness,” a foolhardy goal. 
The general aim of Nahua ethics, then, is not happiness 
but to achieve rootedness (neltilitztli) on tlalticpac. To 
support the idea textually, it will be helpful to have in mind 
a linguistic point. Should one like to form a new word in 
Nahuatl, the language is well equipped with the capacity 
for compounding, much as ancient Greek was. Yet one may 
also make use of what Angel Maria Garibay has called a 
“difrasismo,” which is the expression of one idea in two 
words.21 Examples in English might be “with blood and 
fire,” or “against wind and tide.” This sort of expression was 
extremely common in Nahuatl, and one must be careful 
to catch the metaphorical meaning at work. For if taken 
literally, the meaning of a difrasismo is almost totally lost. 
One of the commonest of these in a philosophic context 
is the phrase in xochi in cuicatl, which, translated literally, 
means “with flower and song,” but taken metaphorically 
means something like “poetry.” 
Returning to the discussion of rootedness, I would like to 
examine the short piece “Flower and Song / Xochi Cuicatl,” 
found in the Cantares Mexicanos, which was composed 
and recited before a meeting of wise men and poets in 
the house of Tecayehautzin. The question at stake in the 
piece is how to achieve some sort of permanence. Lord 
Ayocuan is said to be acquainted with Life Giver, one of the 
names for the single being of existence, teotl. Invoking and 
recalling the lord, the suggestion of the piece is that it is by 
creating “flower and song” that one finds this permanence. 
We read the author’s realization that this (poetic creation) 
must be the answer to the transitoriness of life on tlalticpac
in the following lines: 
So this is how that lord, the vaunted one, 
comes creating them. Yes, with plume like 
bracelet beads he pleases the only-being. 
Is that what pleases the Life Giver? 
Is that the only truth [nelli] on earth [tlalticpac]?22 
So the author comes to the conclusion that by writing 
flower-song, especially the type that addresses the greater 
problems of our human existence, one is best able to find 
“truth” on the slippery earth.23 
What matters for ethical purposes is obscured in the 
English translation. The phrase “aço tle nelli in tlalticpac” is 
best translated as “Is that the only truth on earth?” But the 
word nelli is related to nelhuáyotl, which is a root or base.24 
The metaphorical idea behind the Nahua understanding 
of “truth,” then, is that it is a matter of being rooted like 
a tree, as opposed to sliding about on our slippery earth. 
The goal, the solution to our human problems, then, is to 
find rootedness, which as an abstract substantive would be 
expressed in Nahuatl as neltiliztli. 
An important point here is that the context of the poem 
makes clear that one is to find rootedness in the only being 
of existence, in teotl. Just as is the case with Aristotle’s 
function argument, there is equally a metaphysical backdrop 
to the Nahua account of the good life. The Nahuas were 
pantheists of a sort and took our world to be an expression 
of the single fundamental being of existence. A rooted 
life, then, is not only our highest end, but carries a similar 
normative force. One ought to seek rootedness not only 
on prudential grounds, but because rootedness is the way 
that one truly is given our circumstances. 
The philosophic poem “Flower and Song” provides one 
source of evidence for the normative similarity between 
Aristotle and the Nahua understanding of the good life. 
For additional textual evidence, one might turn to the tenth 
volume of the F.C., which addresses “the people” of the 
Nahua culture. There one finds descriptions of persons 
at work in socially recognized roles. The codex author 
Bernadino de Sahagún is responsible for asking what the 
good and bad forms of each is, e.g., asking, What is a good 
feather worker? What is a bad one? So one cannot say that 
the Nahuas would have formulated the matters explicitly 
in terms of good and bad. What one can note is that in 
their responses, one finds their general understanding of 
how approval and disapprobation were allotted in each 
case, and how they reasoned about what ought to be. In 
describing an adult nobleman, we read the following: 
The good [qualli] middle-aged man is a doer, a 
worker [who is] agile, active, solicitous. 
The bad [tlaueliloc] middle-aged man is lazy, 
negligent, slothful, indolent, sluggish, idle, 
languid, a lump of flesh [quitlatzcopic], a lump of 
flesh with two eyes [cuitlatzcocopictli], a thief.25 
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Similar statements are found throughout the F.C. so that 
one can be certain that this sort of language is not isolated. 
The suggestion is double. First, good adult men are those 
who perform their duties and roles well, while the bad ones 
are indolent. Second, bad adult men hardly resemble men 
at all. They become, rather, mere lumps of flesh. Stated 
otherwise, there are conditions for leading a life in a human 
community, and should one not observe them, one tends 
towards not leading a human life at all. 
To bring all these points together, one might write that
Aristotle and the Aztecs both held to a conception of the good
life as one that is the highest aim one could have, or, more
aptly, live out. They differed in the grounds they provided
for their views. Aristotle’s argument turns on a thesis about
the function (ergon) of a human being, while the Nahuas
held that one should aim for rootedness as (i) a reasonable
response to our circumstances on earth, and as (ii) a basic
condition for leading a life in the human community as part
of teotl. What needs to be clarified now is how exactly this
understanding of the good life could guide our actions. 
3. VIRTUE AND ACTION GUIDANCE 
To spell out how their accounts are action guiding, one 
must broach two questions. First, Aristotle’s eudaimonia is 
clearly linked to his discussion of excellence, arētē, but this 
close link between neltiliztli and excellence has not been 
shown for the Nahuas. While the above shows that they 
had an understanding of the human good which supports 
this line of reasoning, is there a Nahuatl word or phrase that 
serves roughly the same role as arētē, and is it connected to 
an account of rootedness? Second, even though the above 
shows that the Nahuas had a conception of the good life, it 
does not show that neltiliztli functioned in the way required. 
Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill both had conceptions 
of the good life, but neither was a virtue ethicist. How do 
we know that neltiliztli functions like Aristotle’s eudaimonia
and not the summum bonum for Kant and Mill? 
I begin with the matter of “virtue.” In some ways the topic
is difficult because of the abundance of possible terms
available. One should recall that arētē in Greek is derived
from the god Ares, and in Homeric times the word meant
primarily nobility and strength on the battlefield. Over the
following several hundred years of recorded Greek texts, one
finds the term slowly changing from a quality of character
primarily focused on competitive activities to one focused
on cooperative ones—ones that foster life in the city state
(polis). Plato and Aristotle, moreover, played a significant
role in this change, rather willfully adapting common terms
to their purposes.26 “Virtue” or “human excellence,” in short,
did not spring from Zeus’ head fully armored, but was a
concept developed over the course of several centuries
among the Greeks. One should be wary, then, of finding
an exact equivalent in other cultures. Additionally, one
should not expect the Nahuas to have only one such term
just because Hellenistic philosophers ultimately settled on
one. In the Confucian tradition, for example, one finds two
words used for “virtue,” namely, de and ren.27 It might turn
out that the Nahuas had more than one term. The proposal
that I venture here is that there is one broad phrase for
excellence, and that there may be further, more specific
terms for excellence available in other ways, just as de is the
broad term for virtue in the Confucian tradition, and ren the
more specific term focused on human relations.28 
To begin, in Nahuatl, as in Greek, there are several words 
for the good, the noble, and the beautiful. Generally, the 
most broadly used term for “good” is “qualli,” and I have 
indicated it in brackets in above quoted texts.29 The root 
of the word derives from the verb qua, which means to 
eat. The general idea indicated, then, is that something 
is good because assimilable, edible in a way that will 
aid in one’s flourishing. Another common word is yectli, 
which is something good because it is straight. Likely the 
best translation for yectli, then, is rectitude. The Nahuas 
also made use of a difrasismo with these two words as 
components: in qualli in yectli, meaning, too literally, “with 
goodness and straightness.”30 My suggestion is that this 
is the Nahua way of expressing “excellence.” In the tenth 
volume of the F.C., for example, one finds a description 
of the “good” daughter which reads: ichpuchtli in iectli in 
qualli, in qualli ichpuchtli, which might be translated as 
“the excellent daughter, the good daughter.”31 
In this passage, one also finds an explicit connection 
between excellence, so understood, and the good life as 
rootedness. Since the matter is critical, I provide a word-by­
word translation and commentary in the table below. 
yn tecuheuh yn ichpuchtli One’s daughter [who is] This is a phrase indicating the whole idea of a daughter in 
her relation both to a male and female speaker. 
quiztica, macitica, vel, unspoiled, perfect, good, These terms are all difficult to translate, because Christianity 
had already influenced the meaning of the words. Yet, 
none of them in Nahuatl have a fundamental connection to 
Christian understanding of virginity. 
nelli, rooted, Dibble and Anderson omit this word in translation, as it fits 
poorly with the Christianized interpretation of the Nahuatl 
description.32 It is the root of neltiliztli. 
ichpuchtli in iectli in qualli, [who is] the excellent 
daughter, 
There is no sentence break in the Nahuatl, so the idea is 
continued: the rooted daughter is the excellent one … 
in qualli ichpuchtli . . .33 the good daughter … the good one, et cetera. 
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One here finds a description of the “good” daughter as one 
who is rooted, who is leading the best life possible, and one 
who is excellent in doing so. The passage is a difficult one 
to analyze and translate because some Christian influence 
was present at the time that it was recorded, but it does 
indicate that the Nahuas thought to connect virtue (in yectli 
in qualli) and rootedness (neltiliztli). The best life available 
on earth, in short, is one that is performed excellently. 
I turn now to the question whether the Nahuas understood 
the good life in the way required for a virtue ethics. 
One may begin by recalling what is distinctive about 
eudaimonia as it functions for action-guiding purposes. 
For eudaimonists generally, action guidance follows from 
the priority of the good to the right. This is to say that in 
the order of justification, one appeals to a conception 
of the good first, and then concludes to a judgment of 
right action. A eudaemonist, then, might argue that one 
ought not cheat on one’s partner, or that cheating on 
one’s partner is morally wrong, because it harms her by 
inhibiting her flourishing. For a modern philosopher who 
holds to the priority of the right to the good, as Kantian 
deontologists do, moral wrongness functions in a premise 
to one’s conclusion. One ought not cheat on one’s partner 
because it is morally wrong, and one can discern this moral 
wrongness by appeal to an independent test, like the 
categorical imperative procedure.34 
If this difference in the order of justification is what 
distinguishes Aristotle from Kant on the good, then what 
distinguishes Aristotle from Mill on the good? Utilitarian 
consequentialists also appeal to a conception of the good, 
say, a maximum of average utility, in order to determine 
whether an action is right. How is Aristotle, or the 
eudaemonist generally, different? 
To answer this question, one is returned to an untranslatable 
point in the second line of the N.E., since it is there where 
Aristotle introduces an important qualification about 
the character of the highest good as an end. He writes: 
“But there appears to be a difference among the ends; 
for some are activities, others are products apart from 
[the activities which produce] them.”35 In writing this, 
Aristotle distinguishes between two sorts of activities: 
ta erga (productions) and hai energeiai (performances/ 
activities).36 Productive actions are of the sort that yield 
a product apart from the action, such as a potter’s vase. 
Performance actions are those that are actions (erga) in 
(en) themselves; the doing constitutes what they are. They 
are like a dance or a jazz solo. Importantly for Aristotle, the 
highest end, eudaimonia, is a performance. This means 
that he is thinking of it in a fundamentally different way 
than a utilitarian would. To clarify, in the opening lines of 
Utilitarianism Mill writes: “All action is for the sake of some 
end, and rules of action, it seems natural to suppose, must 
take their whole character and color from the end to which 
they are subservient.”37 Happiness, as Mill understands it, 
then, is the product of acting in such a way as to promote 
the happiness of the greatest number. For Aristotle, by 
contrast, eudaimonia is not conceived of as a product, the 
end result of action, but the performance of living one’s 
own life well. It is your life performed well, not a set of 
mental states. As a result, it would be incoherent to speak 
of maximizing this sort of happiness, apart from living it 
better—with more virtue. 
Did the Nahuas think of neltiliztli as Aristotle thought of 
eudaimonia? One may answer in the affirmative for two 
reasons. First, in no extant literature is there a discussion 
of an independent test for assessing right action, so they 
did not think of it in the way that Kant does. Second, if 
one looks to their analysis of good and bad performance 
of social roles, one sees that they justify assessment by 
appealing to a harm or help rendered. For example, here is 
how the philosopher, or tlamatini, is described in volume 
ten of the F.C.: 
The good [qualli] tlamatini is a physician, a person 
of trust, a counselor; an instructor worthy of 
confidence, deserving of credibility, deserving 
of faith; a teacher. He is an advisor, a counselor, 
a good example; a teacher of prudence, of 
discretion; a light, a guide who lays out one’s path, 
who goes accompanying one. . . . The bad [amo 
qualli] tlamatini is a stupid physician, silly, decrepit, 
pretending to be a person of trust, a counselor, 
advised. . . . [He is] a soothsayer, a deluder, he 
deceives, confounds, causes ills, leads into evil.38 
What one notes in this description is the way in which 
a person performs her social role, the quality of her 
contribution to the community, is the source of praise or 
blame. The bad [amo qualli] philosopher specifically causes 
ill, both to the person counseled, and to the community at 
large. The good [qualli] philosopher is he who is a light and 
a mirror for his patients and the community. Assessments 
of right action, then, follow from an understanding of what 
it means to lead a good human and communal life. I think it 
clear, then, that the Nahuas reasoned about the good and 
the right in the same sort of way as eudaemonists do. 
4. WAYS OF LIFE 
At this point one might have some further pertinent 
questions. Aristotle’s understanding of eudaimonia is 
connected to a way of life, the contemplative, and a 
program for general living. To what extent is something like 
this present in the Nahuatl understanding of neltiliztli? The 
answer, I think, distances the Nahuas from Aristotle, since 
the Nahuas do advocate for two (or more) approaches to 
rootedness, but they have no notion that is like the Greek 
bios. 
Beginning with Aristotle, much of the picture for his 
understanding of eudaimonia emerges from the foregoing. 
Each of us leads her life by organizing and deliberating 
about her ends. This is not something that happens easily, 
and so it requires skill, virtue (arētē), to perform such 
organizing well. Moreover, Aristotle tells us that the way 
that we lead our lives as humans, the way that we enjoy 
human Eudaimonia, is to employ logos, to employ reason 
broadly understood.39 The special virtue of logos for ethics 
is, of course, prudence, phronēsis. And it is phronēsis which 
acts in consort with the other virtues to enable each of us 
to live well, to lead a eudaimon life. None of this, however, 
tells us what sits at the top of the telic hierarchy. Is it just 
anything we could choose? 
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Aristotle’s answer is somewhat elliptical, but it looks as 
though he suggests that what sits at the top of the telic 
hierarchy is a way of life, a bios. He writes: 
For three ways of life stand out most; the one just 
mentioned [i.e., of pleasure], the political, and 
third, the theoretical [theōrētikos]. The many appear 
to be quite slavish in deciding [proairoumenoi] 
on a way of life [bion] fit for livestock, but their 
argument has support on account of the many of 
means who share the sentiments of Sardanapalus. 
The refined, on the other hand, and those of action 
decide on a life of honor; for the life [biou] of 
politics has nearly this end [telos].40 
In this passage Aristotle gives a few brief rebuttals to 
the life of pleasure, and that aimed at honor, though 
he waits until book 10 to provide a full defense of the 
life of contemplation. What matters for the present is 
what Aristotle’s comments suggest for the structure of 
eudaimonia, namely, that a bios is decided on as an end 
(telos). This is not the same, however, as choosing a 
particular outcome, or set of outcomes. For a way of life is 
a characteristic way of choosing and ordering one’s ends 
so that their performance is of a typical kind. At the top of 
our telic hierarchy, then, is not a final goal, but a way of 
life.41 And Aristotle later argues (in book 10) that only one 
such way of life, that typified by theoretical contemplation, 
is suitable to humans as a complete goal.42 
There is an additional point which proves helpful for a 
comparison with the Nahua conception of the good life. 
One of the reasons Aristotle so hastily dismisses the life 
of pleasure is that he identifies it with one that is fit for 
livestock, boskēmatōn—literally for fattened animals. 
Implicit in Aristotle’s language is a distinction between 
a way of life, bios, and mere life, zoē. In the opening 
passages of his Politics,43 Aristotle distinguishes between a 
natural tendency, like procreation, which he does not think 
is the result of a decision (proairēsis), a natural union, like 
a household, which is an association to meet the needs 
of daily life, and a state, which “exists for the sake of 
living well.”44 While humans also lead a life of zoē, one of 
satisfying those necessities like eating, we also decide on 
certain goals for the sake of living well. When we engage in 
activities or practices (like music and dance) for these latter 
ends, we are leading a way of life, a bios. This is why it is 
a sort of category error, for Aristotle, to decide on a way of 
life that would be co-extensive with the activities needed 
for mere survival. It also means that eudaimonia ultimately 
concerns the performance of one’s life by organizing ends 
that are chosen above and beyond necessities. 
The specification of which way of life is best for Aristotle 
has been a source of controversy, not because it is unclear, 
but because scholars have been puzzled in trying to 
explain the compatibility of the intellectualist account of 
eudaimonia, in book 10, with the comprehensive account 
that is articulated in the rest of the N.E.45 I shall not here 
try to provide my own sense of the compatibility of these 
two accounts in Aristotle. Rather, I would like to note that 
the Nahuas also seem to give an account of the good life 
that is in some ways split between a comprehensive and 
an intellectualist approach. Yet, because they do not make 
use of anything like bios as a concept, they do not have a 
similar tension. 
To understand why the Nahuas may have this advantage, 
it might be helpful to recall that neltiliztli is recommended 
both on prudential grounds and on the grounds that one 
takes root in teotl, the way things are. So that if one is to 
lead a life in a human community, one must lead a rooted 
life. Surveying the existing literature and anthropological 
record, one finds that for the Nahuas one’s life appears 
to take root at four related levels: in one’s body, in one’s 
psyche, in one’s community by social rites and role, and 
in teotl. 
Rootedness in one’s body was made possible by 
participating in a number of practices. The Nahuas held 
that the body serves as a temporary location for three 
forces which animate us: tonalli, which resides in the head 
and provides the energy needed for growth; teyolia, which 
resides in the heart and provides memory, emotion, and 
knowledge; and ihiyotl, which resides in the liver and 
provides passion, bravery, hatred, and love, among others.46 
Anthropologists have recovered many figurines posed in 
ways that look like yoga poses; they include, for example, 
a position almost exactly similar to the lotus position. From 
the description of the body and its movements, one gathers 
that a regular practice of yoga-like movements was thought 
to help balance or root some of our bodily energies. 
An additional way in which one sought a rooted life was 
in one’s psyche—bearing in mind that the difference 
between psyche and body was not nearly as sharp as our 
current understanding. The point in this regard is that if one 
learns to assume an identity, a certain kind of personhood, 
one gains rootedness. For example, in the Hueheutlatolli, 
the Discourses of the Elders, one finds a congratulatory 
speech in which the elders discourse with the new bride 
and groom, new owners of a face and heart. The groom, for 
example, responds to the elders, stating, 
Ye have shown me favor, ye have inclined your 
hearts [amoiollotzin]; on my behalf ye have 
suffered affliction. I shall inflict sickness on you, 
on your face [temuxtli].47 
In this case the face (ixtli) and heart (yollotl) together 
indicate the whole person, one’s character. The groom’s 
responses address both facets of the elder’s personality. 
In marriage, likewise, the elders bind the couple together 
as a new identity, by tying the man’s cape to the woman’s 
skirt, and speak both to their faces and their hearts. The 
suggestion is that in such a way they gain personhood, a 
way by which they will stand here on the slippery place. 
Character virtues, then, primarily find their place at this 
level in facilitating the acquisition and maintenance of 
one’s “face and heart,” one’s character. 
Yet, these points already slide over into rootedness in the 
community, the third level of rootedness. For the bride and 
groom are not only bound together, but bound within and 
before the community. Participation in one’s community, 
then, was carried out in festivals and social rites of various 
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sorts. In the marriage ceremony described, for example, 
the fathers, mothers, grandparents, and related family 
members all have specific roles to play. It was, moreover, 
the role of the tlamatinimê, the philosophers, to foster the 
acquisition of a face through counseling, and the goal of 
education to teach young Nahua children the dispositions 
that would sustain healthy judgment. One’s character, then, 
enabled one to execute the offices of one’s social role well, 
but these not only had more specific demands, they also 
served the purpose of training or habituating one into that 
character. 
A final way to achieve rootedness was in teotl directly. 
The three dimensions of rootedness just discussed are, of 
course, ways to be rooted in teotl, but in an indirect sort 
of way. The Nahuas appeared to have held that there were 
also a few other, more direct, ways to be rooted in teotl. 
In the above quoted passage from “Flower and Song,” the 
specific answer given to achieve rootedness is to compose 
philosophic poetry. This is not too distant from Aristotle’s 
insistence on the life of the mind. In some of the more 
mystical passages, it appears that some thought the use of 
hallucinogenic substances was perhaps another way. Any 
of these ways, though, were thought to be ways to make 
something of beauty of our short time on tlalticpac. 
At this point, one might wonder how the Nahuas are not 
saddled with the same sort of difficulty that faces Aristotle. 
Rootedness appears to have both a comprehensive 
meaning, and an intellectualist one, reserved for those 
who can compose flower and song. In response, I think the 
problem is at least not so acute among the Nahuas. A bios, to 
recall, has two important features. First, it is a characteristic 
way of choosing among our goals and ordering them in 
the telic hierarchy of our life’s plan. This is the sense in 
which it sits atop that hierarchy. Second, it is a form of life 
that is chosen above and beyond the necessities of zoē. 
While the Nahuas did have various social roles, which in 
the case of a philosopher, or physician, might be counted 
as a characteristic way of choosing among ends, they did 
not distinguish such ways as something distinct from the 
necessities of mere living. All people, then, were to aim for 
rootedness at the levels of mind, psyche, and community. 
It just turns out that for some people, participation in 
the community also afforded the possibility for a more 
direct rootedness. The philosophers, for example, found 
rootedness in their communities, in part, by composing 
“flower and song,” which just happened to be a direct 
way of finding rootedness on tlalticpac. The ways are 
complementary among the Nahuas, then, rather than 
exclusionary, as they appear to be in Aristotle. 
5. MORAL MOTIVATION 
While the discussion concerning ways of life (bioi) highlights 
one difference between Aristotle and the Nahuas on the 
good life that might count in favor of the Nahuas’ view, 
another related topic might pose a challenge for it. That 
topic concerns the role of pleasure, hēdonē, or elevated 
emotional states for the good life. The specific difficulty is 
that by retaining a connection between pleasure and the 
good life, Aristotle also solves an important problem for 
moral motivation. To the question, why should we be good? 
Aristotle can answer: because it is more enjoyable than not 
being good. If the Nahuas do not retain this connection, 
then it would appear that they lose this advantage. 
In response, one might begin by recalling the grounds for 
Aristotle’s argument in the N.E.48 For Aristotle, pleasure 
perfects, in the sense of completes, the performance of 
eudaimonia as an “end which supervenes like the bloom 
of youth to those in the prime of their lives.”49 If it is not a 
constitutive or essential component of eudaimonia, then it 
is internally related as its completed form. The reason for 
this is that eudaimonia spells out what it means to lead a 
life as a human, as opposed to the life of a beast or angel. 
This life must make use of logos in some way, and it is 
ultimately led in the company of others (as the arguments 
in Aristotle’s Politics makes clear). The pleasure that follows 
for this life, as a result, is a properly human pleasure, and 
this is the only way to achieve it. While misfortune may 
intervene, as Aristotle’s discussion of Priam suggests, 
even in those tragic cases “the beautiful shines through.”50 
Only by living well could Priam have had human happiness 
anyway. Should fortune favor us, moreover, then our lives 
enjoy not only happiness, eudaimonia, but blessedness, 
makaria.51 
For the Nahuas, life of tlalticpac has no similar perfection. 
The good life, understood as neltilitztli, bears only an 
accidental relation to elevated emotional states, to one 
sense of hēdonē. Composing flower-song, or uniting one’s 
face and heart, makes for a better and more beautiful, if 
still transient existence. It is better and more beautiful, 
finally, because it is ultimately one rooted in teotl, in the 
way things are through their changes. 
While it is too much for the Nahuas to think that pleasure is 
more than an incidental feature of our life’s performance, 
one nevertheless has reasons to act for it that are distinct 
from prudential or dutiful considerations. This is why the 
rooted life ought to be considered a conception of “the good 
life,” and why the Nahuas do not face a problem concerning 
moral motivation. The argument so far has reviewed some 
of the many roles and rites at work in Nahua culture. What 
one sees in these descriptions is that the feather-worker 
acts out of a passion for his craft. The philosopher acts 
for a love of wisdom. And mothers and fathers act out of 
love for their children. These reasons—namely, passions 
and loves—are neither prudential nor dutiful, and yet they 
provide us with reasons for acting. They are, moreover, 
some of the more common motivations that we have for 
undertaking action. Seeking to leading a rooted life, then, 
ultimately means that one is seeking to lead a worthwhile 
life. Even if pleasure is incidental to this way of life, one still 
has the greater bulk of reasons to pursue it. 
6. CLARIFICATIONS 
The present argument has so far established a number 
of points of agreement and noted a few differences 
between Aristotle’s conception of the good life and that 
of the Nahuas. Yet, I must now pause to clarify two points 
regarding the analysis of Nahua understanding of neltiliztli
specifically. I pose these points as objections and supply 
responses in order to clarify the nature of the claims so far 
made. 
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A first concern might run as follows. Does the present 
analysis of neltiliztli cohere with broader Nahua 
conceptions? For example, in the popular religious beliefs 
of the Nahuas, mothers who died in childbirth went to the 
heavens of the afterlife. Their understanding of rewards 
and punishments, then, seems to be rather fatalistic. How 
is this religious understanding compatible with the account 
so far outlined, in which deliberation about ends, or at least 
highest ends, seems to play so central a role? 
Two distinctions could aid in answering this question. 
One concerns the difference between neltiliztli, which is a 
conception of the good life here on tlalticpac, and whatever 
rewards were thought to follow in the afterlife. It is true that 
in common religious belief, warriors who fell in battle (in 
specific ways) and women who died in childbirth were both 
thought to go to Tamoanchan. But they would not, then, be 
leading lives on tlalticpac. There is nothing incompatible 
between the idea of leading a rooted life on tlalticpac, and 
that of receiving rewards in the afterlife on account of a 
very specific occurrence. What seems to be at stake in the 
question is a broader sense of justice that would obtain 
between actions performed in this life and rewards in 
the afterlife. Yet it is not clear to me that the Nahuas held 
to such a (Christian) view. In broaching religious beliefs, 
however, one is led to a second pertinent distinction. 
The second distinction concerns the character of the 
present study. My goal, unlike that of anthropologists, 
has not been to reconstruct the general understanding 
of the good life among ordinary Nahuas. Philosophers of 
classical antiquity look to understand specific philosophic 
claims among the Greeks and Romans, and so they do not 
try to make their arguments consistent with wider cultural 
notions like miasmic contamination. I do likewise here, and 
so have prescinded from a consideration of the broader 
Nahua understanding of tlazolli, which is remarkably like 
the Greek miasma in certain respects. 
We have evidence that the elders and tlamatinimê (plural 
of tlamatini, i.e., “philosopher”) often did break with 
ordinary understandings. Nezahualcoyotl, for example, 
openly wonders whether there is an afterlife, or if it is only 
a comforting fable. In a philosophic poem entitled “I Am 
Sad,” he writes: 
I am sad, I grieve 
I, lord Nezahualcoyotl. 
With flowers and with songs 
I remember the princes, 
Those who went away, 
Tezozomoctzin, and that one Cuacuahtzin. 
Do they truly live, 
There Where-in-Someway-One-Exists?52 
Nezahualcoyotl is in these lines clearly expressing doubt 
about life in a place after death. It must be a place where 
one in some, non-fleshy way exists? This doubt in the 
afterlife, further, explains Nezahualcoyotl’s ongoing 
preoccupation with death, since he is little comforted by 
the ordinary stories. In brief, the philosophers and elders53 
broke with established religious beliefs in their recorded 
writings, and so it would seem unreasonable to criticize 
the present philosophic study for not conforming to the 
religious beliefs of other segments of the population. 
An additional concern is that in presenting neltiliztli in 
relation to Aristotelian eudaimonism, I have shaped the 
Nahua claims in a way that is too “individualist,” especially 
in my focus on action guidance and the search for the 
good life. How does that square with the broader, more 
sociocentric, understanding of the Nahua culture that 
anthropologists have described? 
In response, one notes that “individualism” and 
“sociocentrism” are slippery terms. What I hope to have 
shown is that the Nahuas were in two specific ways more 
“sociocentric” than Aristotle. This is the case, first, in the 
multi-leveled way in which one achieves rootedness. 
While I believe that Aristotle is often misunderstood in 
contemporary scholarship as focusing exclusively on the 
individual pursuit of happiness, the Nahua emphasis on 
finding rootedness through one’s specific social role in the 
community adds a social dimension that is not present in 
Aristotle’s account. Indeed, a greater part of action guidance 
for the Nahuas turns on how well one executes the offices 
of one’s social role, and this is strikingly different from 
Aristotle’s focus on excellences that any human should 
develop. Second, the way that social rites and practices 
were thought to be an essential part of character formation 
finds no parallel in Aristotle. He nowhere discusses 
character formation by way of participating in social rites, 
but the Nahuas do often rather elaborately. The above 
excerpts are taken from exhortations by elders for youths 
engaged in just these rites. In these two ways, then, I 
believe that the Nahuas were more community oriented, or 
“sociocentric,” than was Aristotle. 
There is another sense, however, in which it might be 
thought that the Nahuas were more “sociocentric” than 
Aristotle. They might be thought to have held to a sense of 
ethical life that is socio-holist. On such an understanding, 
the Nahuas would have held that the fundamental unit of 
moral concern was the community and not the individual. 
If this is right, then the present development of neltiliztli, 
especially in those sections concerning action guidance, 
would be true, but rather misleading. 
In response, I do not think it accurate to claim that the 
Nahuas held that the fundamental unit of moral concern 
was the community, rather than the individual. In the texts 
reviewed above, various agents are criticized for harming 
other people directly, and not for harming the community 
by way of harming individual people. The texts themselves, 
then, conflict with this interpretation. Moreover, socio­
holism is problematic from a philosophic point of view,54 
and so I think it counts toward the greater cogency of their 
position that the tlamatinimê were not inclined to support 
it. 
7. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
The present essay hopes to have taken a first step toward 
serious philosophic reflection on the ethical understanding 
of the good life, neltiliztli, among the Nahuas. Their 
conception is in many ways like Aristotle’s understanding of 
eudaimonia. What one seeks in life, they held, is a response 
PAGE 18 SPRING 2017 | VOLUME 16  | NUMBER 2 
APA NEWSLETTER  |  HISPANIC/LATINO ISSUES IN PHILOSOPHY
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
to the basic conditions of life on tlalticpac is rootedness. 
What one seeks in choosing ends that are above mere 
necessities, Aristotle held, is eudaimonia. For the Nahuas 
philosophical poetry provides the best kind of answer, 
the best rootedness, in response to the slipperiness of 
tlalticpac, since flower and song outlast and are more 
beautiful than other transient creations. For Aristotle, the 
life of theoretical contemplation is that which is best suited 
to an animal which leads its life by means of logos. For 
both, however, this best way of life is related to the broader 
aim of living well in other activities, which require excellent 
qualities of character (i.e., virtues) to achieve. Finally, 
in both cases, right action is assessed by appealing to a 
conception of what is good, how one flourishes, which is 
thus justificationally prior to a conception of the right. 
At the end of these reflections, then, one is presented 
with two different articulations of the good life. Most of 
us, I would venture, would like to believe that pleasure is 
somehow internally connected to the best performance of 
our life’s act on the world’s stage. Yet we also recognize 
that perhaps this may be but much hopeful thinking. Nor 
is it clear, moreover, that this sort of difference is one that 
can be resolved simply by an analysis of concepts. Aristotle 
and the Aztecs each have a different preferred sense of 
“pleasure,” and so different understandings of its relation 
to the good life. Which sense is better for ethical purposes 
is not a matter which could be resolved only by looking to 
the meanings of the terms under consideration. Rather, it 
must take its measure from the broader coherence of the 
ethical theories as a whole, and their respective abilities 
to illuminate our moral lives. The present reflection on the 
Aztecs, as a result, highlights less a problem for resolution 
than a problem of the human condition. It challenges us, 
moreover, to question the received (Western) wisdom 
about the good life. And we should be better for it, whether, 
as Aristotle contends, because it will bring us pleasure in 
perfecting our activities as beings possessing logos, or 
whether, as the Nahuas held, that it makes a more beautiful 
pattern of our activities on the slippery earth. 
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NOTES 
1.	 Winner of the 2016 APA Prize in Latin American Thought. Versions 
of this essay were presented at the Trans-American Experience 
conference at the University of Oregon in Eugene (2015), and 
the Latinx Philosophy conference at Columbia University in New 
York City (2016). I would like to thank many members of both 
audiences, as well as the anonymous reviewers for the Newsletter 
on Hispanic/Latino Issues in Philosophy, for the helpful feedback 
on the ideas developed here. 
2.	 Aristotle identifies eudaimonia, or “happiness,” with the highest 
aim in The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. H. Rackham, rev. ed., Loeb 
Classical Library (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934), at 
1095a15–20. As a note, translations of Aristotle are my own. 
3.	 I have in mind especially James Maffie’s Aztec Philosophy: 
Understanding a World in Motion (Boulder: Colorado University 
Press, 2014). Maffie has, in his entry “Aztec Philosophy” for the 
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://www.iep.utm.edu/ 
aztec/ (last accessed September 30, 2016), provided what is 
likely the most philosophic overview of Aztec ethics. His purpose 
there, however, was much broader. 
4.	 In this respect, I have in mind especially Miguel León-Portilla’s 
La filosofía náhuatl: Estudiada en sus fuentes con un nuevo 
apéndice, new ed., prologue by Angel María Garibay K. (Mexico 
City: UNAM, 2001 [1956]). The present essay is much indebted 
to some of the remarks León-Portilla makes in this book. I have 
also profited greatly from his Aztec Thought and Culture: A Study 
of the Ancient Nahuatl Mind, trans. Jack Emory Davis (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1963). 
5.	 Of course, anthropologists and art historians have long been 
interested in Nahuatl ethics, but their concern is rather with 
what might be called an analysis of cultural mores. Two pieces 
in English that have been particularly influential for the present 
essay are Louise M. Burkhart’s The Slippery Earth: Nahua-Christian 
Moral Dialogue in Sixteenth-Century Mexico (Tuscon: University 
of Arizona Press, 1989) and Pete Sigal’s The Flower and the 
Scorpion: Sexuality and Ritual in Early Nahua Culture (Durham and 
London: Duke University Press, 2011). In the former case, one 
learns to be cautious of Castilian influences and interpolations, 
even in the construction of Sahagun’s Florentine Codex, on 
which much of the present essay relies. In the latter, one comes 
to recognize the rather tendentious approach to (especially) 
sexual ethics one finds presented in almost any recorded work, 
including the Florentine Codex. Alfredo López Austin’s Cuerpo 
humano e ideología: Las concepciones de los antiguos Nahuas, 
2nd ed., 2 vols. (Mexico City, UNAM, 1984), has also proven 
helpful for understanding the general Nahua worldview, though 
the implications of his study are more immediate, I think, for 
Nahua metaphysics. 
6.	 N.E., 1094a. 
7.	 Ibid., 1235b. 
8.	 Ibid., 1145b. 
9.	 Richard Kraut has a fine review and assessment of Aristotle’s
method in ethics in “How to Justify Ethical Propositions: Aristotle’s
Method,” in The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, 
ed. Richard Kraut, 76–95 (New York: Blackwell Publishing, 2006). 
10. Technically, it 	cannot be that at which all things aim, since 
inanimate things do not aim at anything. The sense seems to be 
restricted to human agents. This portion of the argument is taken 
from (and developed) in my essay “Natural Goodness and the 
Normativity Challenge: Happiness Across Cultures,” American 
Catholic Philosophical Association 87 (2013): 183–94. 
11. N.E., 1095a. 
12. C.D.C. Reeve, for example, has a line-by-line analysis of the 
opening passages of the N.E. and comes to just this conclusion. 
See especially chapter seven of his Action, Contemplation, and 
Happiness: An Essay on Aristotle (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2012). Daniel Russell comes to a similar conclusion in his 
Happiness for Humans (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
13. N.E., 1099a. 
14. Ibid., 1098a. 
15.	 I have explored this metaphysical backdrop at length in my 
“Natural Goodness and the Normativity Challenge: Happiness 
Across Cultures.” 
16. Bernadino de Sahagún, The Florentine Codex: General History of 
the Things of New Spain, ed. and trans. Charles E. Dibble and 
Arthur J. O. Anderson, 12 vols. (New Mexico: University of Santa 
Fe, 1969), Vol. 6, 228. Translation modified. 
17.	 Ibid., Vol. 6, 228. 
18. For a fuller development of the practical syllogism for Aristotle, 
see Paula Gottleib’s “The Practical Syllogism,” in The Blackwell 
Guide to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, ed. Richard Kraut, 218– 
33 (New York: Blackwell Publishers, 2006). 
19.	 One may find the Nahuatl transcription in Ballads of the Lords 
of New Spain: The Codex Romances de los señores de Nueva 
España, transcription and translation by John Bierhorst (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 2009), fols. 3v.-4r. The translation 
quoted, however, is Miguel León-Portilla’s in Fifteen Poets of the 
Aztec World (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1992), 92. 
León-Portilla’s text also includes the Nahuatl to accompany each 
translation. Bierhorst’s interpretation of Aztec culture is rather 
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widely disputed, and his translations tendentiously support his 
position, so that I have entirely avoided using his translations and, 
when necessary, have translated the texts myself. For a review 
of the difficulties with Bierhorst’s “ghost songs” hypothesis, see 
León-Portilla’s response in the “Introduction” to his Fifteen Poets 
of the Aztec World, especially pages 41–44. 
20. For the Nahuatl transcription, see Ballads of the Lords of New 
Spain, fols. 21 r.—22 v. The translation is from Fifteen Poets of the 
Aztec World, 91. 
21.	 Angel María Garibay, Llave del Náhuatl, Colección de Torzos 
Clásicos con Gramática y Vocabulario, para utilidad de los 
Principiantes (Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno Press, 1981), 112. 
22. One may find the original Nahuatl in Cantares Mexicanos: Songs 
of the Aztecs, transcription and translation by John Bierhorst 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985), fol. 9v. The translation, 
for the above noted reason, is substantially modified. 
23.	 An important implication of this point, but which I cannot develop 
at length here, is that the Nahuatl sense of “truth” is rather 
different from a correspondence theory of truth—something 
which I’ve often thought to be Aristotle’s stance on truth. For 
the Nahuas, one not only comes to know the truth, but most 
fundamentally comes to live the truth. 
24. Rémi Siméon’s Diccionario de lengua Nahuatl o Mexicana, 2nd 
ed., trans. Josefina Oliva De Coll (Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno, 
1981) reads: “nelhuayo adj. Provisto de raíces, que tiene raíces. 
R. nelhuayotl.” 
25. Florentine Codex, vol. 10, 11. Translation modified. 
26. This topic has long been the subject of study among classicists. 
While Werner Jaeger develops this thesis to some extent, I have 
in mind the patient argument which A. W. H. Adkins develops in 
his Moral Values and Political Behaviour in Ancient Greece: From 
Homer to the End of the Fifth Century (New York: W. W. Norton 
and Co., 1972). The whole of the book is devoted to supporting 
the points just made. 
27.	 For the specifics on the Confucian tradition on virtue as de and 
ren, see chapter one of Jiyuan Yu’s The Ethics of Confucius and 
Aristotle: Mirrors of Virtue (New York: Routledge Press, 2007). 
28. Following Lopez Austin, in 	The Human Body and Ideology: 
Concepts of the Ancient Nahuas, trans B. Ortiz de Montellano 
and T. Ortiz de Montellano (Salt Lake City: University of Utah 
Press, 1988), 189, another possible candidate would be the 
“upright man,” tlacamelahuac. This term derives from tlacatl, 
meaning human, and melauacayotl, meaning rectitude or 
making something straight. The term, however, likely had a more 
specific sense. I tend to think it a closer candidate for Aristotle’s 
phronimos. Another possible candidate is tlaçoyotl, which is 
sometimes translated as “excellence.” Yet this term derives from 
tlaçotli, which means valuable or expensive, and so is more likely 
a term for inherent worth, or (better) highest worth. 
29.	 In what follows, it may be helpful to bear in mind that Nahuatl 
does not have a standard orthography, though current 
scholarship tends to use a modified Franciscan lexigraphy. The 
F.C. in particular tends to make non-standard use even from 
one line to the next. One should bear in mind, then, that “i” and 
“y” are often substitutes, and “j” and “i” are as well. In the F.C., 
the existence of glottal stops and breathers is most commonly 
indicated with an “h.” 
30. In fact, the “-ness,” indicating an abstractive substantive in 
English, is not present in the Nahuatl. I added it for the purposes 
of readability. 
31.	 Florentine Codex, vol. 10, 2. These translations are my own. 
Dibble and Anderson render the entire phrase as “the good 
daughter.” 
32. To be fair to Dibble and Anderson, one purpose of their translation 
was to stay in contact with the insights that informed the Spanish 
which Sahagun rendered in his original transcription, but without 
translating through Spanish to English. If Sahagún interpreted 
the Nahuatl in a specific way, then their task was to make that 
known in English as well. My goals are different ones. 
33. Florentine Codex, vol. 10, 2. Translation is my own. 
34. Of all the authors that make this contrast, John Rawls is likely the 
clearest. For his account of the categorical imperative procedure 
and its difference from the categorical imperative itself, see 
his Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, ed. Barbara 
Herman (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), especially 
chapter ten on the categorical imperative. He makes the contrast 
between orders of justification in A Theory of Justice, rev. ed., 
24–30 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999). 
35. N.E., 1094a. 
36. “ta men gar eisin energiai, ta de par’ autas erga tina” (1094a2-3). 
37.	 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, ed. George Sher (New York: 
Hackett Press, 2001), 2. 
38. Florentine Codex, vol. 10, 29-30. Translation modified. 
39.	 N.E., 1098a. 
40. Ibid., 1095b. 
41. This approach to the organization of our preferences, so that 
(1) eudaimonia is the skillful (i.e., excellent) management of 
our telic hierarchy, and (2) a way of life is what sits atop the 
hierarchy would appear to enable Aristotle to avoid the sorts 
of concern Larry Temkin raises in Rethinking the Good: Moral 
Ideals and the Nature of Practical Reason (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2012). A key objection Temkin raises is that our 
preferences cannot be demonstrated to be strictly transitive, so 
that preference orders (and so equivalence relations) cannot 
be said to obtain for our preferences. This spells trouble for 
informed preference consequentialists and anyone who agrees 
broadly with John Rawls’ descriptive account of the good in part 
three of A Theory of Justice. Aristotle’s conception of the good, 
if the above is correct, would appear to allow him to avoid this 
sort of concern, since a bios requires only a characteristic way of 
putting goals in relation to each other, and not anything like even 
a partial preference order. The matter, clearly, is more complex 
than can be addressed here, but I thought it worth noting that 
Aristotle’s approach may avoid a number of modern headaches 
concerning the good. 
42. This is Aristotle’s argument in the Nicomachean Ethics, 1177a10­
178a10. 
43.	 Aristotle, Aristotelis Politica, ed. W. D. Ross (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1957). 
44. Ibid., 1252b. 
45.	 For a taste of the controversy, see Thomas Nagel’s criticism in 
“Aristotle on Eudaimonia,” in Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, ed. 
Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, 7–14 (Berkely: University of California 
Press, 1980), and J. L. Ackrill’s tentative reply in “Aristotle on 
Eudaimonia” in the same volume Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, 
15–33. 
46. These points have been made at length in Lopez Austin’s work as 
well as David Carrasco’s Religions of Mesoamerica: Cosmivision 
and Ceremonial Centers (San Francisco: Harper and Row 
Publishers, 1990). 
47.	 Florentine Codex, vol. 6, 127. Translation modified. Incidentally, 
this phrase, which looks to be an insult, is a compliment in 
Nahua culture. One “balances” one’s wishes of good fortune 
with bad fortune in order to wish another well. The section ends, 
for example, by welcoming the new couple into the society by 
telling them that they are abandoned. The statements read: “for 
it is our way of doing things on earth (in tlalticpac); for no one 
is concerned with anyone; for we have already abandoned thee. 
Take heed of this,” 132–33. Translation modified. 
48. The present discussion makes use of points that Aristotle 
develops in books 1 and 10 of the N.E., but for the sake of clarity, 
I have omitted Aristotle’s distinct discussion of pleasure in book 
7. I do not think the present argument turns on the difference 
between pleasure understood as an uninterrupted activity, as 
one largely finds it in book 7, and pleasure as a sort of perfection 
of our other activities. See Julia Annas’ essay, “Aristotle on 
Pleasure and Goodness,” in Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, ed. 
Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1980), 285–99 for an account that reconciles Aristotle’s various 
statements on this topic. 
49. N.E., 1174b. 
50. Ibid., 1100b. 
51. Ibid., 1099b. 
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52.	 Cantares Mexicanos, fols. 25r and v. Translation is slightly 
modified for readability from Miguel León-Portilla’s in Fifteen 
Poets of the Aztec World, 93. 
53.	 I write “philosophers and elders” to indicate the possibility that 
these were distinct groups, though they likely were not. 
54. I think the problems are well-known. Yet, to be a little more 
specific, a principle problem facing any morally “holist” account 
of action guidance is that forms of fascism come to be readily 
supportable. If the community is the ultimate unit of moral 
concern, then the sacrifice of an individual is of no more 
consequence than the sacrifice of a gangrenous finger to save 
the life of the individual (maybe even less so). 
Tsotsil Epistemology: An Intangible 
Inheritance 
Manuel Bolom Pale 
Edited and translated by Carlos Alberto
Sánchez 
When we think that reality is constructed, what 
we are doing is considering a space needing of 
conquest. 
–Hugo Zemelman 
INTRODUCTION
In what follows, I will reflect on originary peoples [pueblos 
originarios]. Specifically, my reflections will focus on the 
thought, cosmovision, and philosophy of the Tsotsil peoples 
of Huixtán, Chiapas. The main objective of this work is to 
propose arguments that will allow us to better understand 
the postures and forms of resistance that characterize 
the thought of these people, as well as their communal 
practices, their principles, enunciations, and sayings, so as 
to open up the possibility of reconsidering our own reality, 
especially in the realm of education. 
Authors such as Leopoldo Zea, Enrique Dussel, Walter 
Mignolo, Anibal Quijano, Arturo Escobar, Edgardo Lander, 
Francisco López Segrera, Hugo Zemelman, Boaventura 
Sousa Santos y Daniel Carlos Gutiérrez Rohán share as 
a common theme the advent of a new Latin American 
thinking; however, it is not my objective to take up the 
critical apparatus of these authors, but rather, what interests 
us here is to show that there are other forms of thinking 
and other points of departure that can be found outside 
[established] theory and external to academic philosophies, 
namely, the philosophical practices of originary peoples. 
In our study, we have decided to look at thought, 
experience, and knowledge from the standpoint of the 
specific philosophical practices of the Tsotsil, risking, of 
course, that we have involuntarily situated ourselves in the 
myopic vision of our own perspective. Affirming “our own 
perspective” means that we also accept the existence of 
“other” perspectives; even if it is just in the act of indicating 
this or that, we present ourselves with every judgment of 
comparison, and we make distinctions because there are 
certainly things about us that we recognize but would 
rather not. For this reason, we must distinguish, in the 
construction of knowledge, between thought and practice. 
The study of thought requires vigilance and, simultaneously, 
the capacity to admire. Thus, we are allowed to contemplate 
the otherness of the indigenous given that the myth 
of homogeneity has been, finally, demolished. This is 
significant since in the past the problem has always been 
the negation of indigenous knowledge, brought about by 
the need to legitimate the paradigms of the great theorists, 
and has also made it so that other, more urgent things in 
relation to thought have to be kept out of consideration. 
Thus, in what follows we aim to see past a fissure, with 
critical eyes, toward the thought of originary peoples, 
namely, the thought of the Tsotsil. 
With the Tsotsil, knowledge is constructed in accordance 
with certain categories that point to the profundity of their 
historical thinking in relation to practice. This means that 
practice has a lot to do with the construction of subjects; 
as such, the objective of this text will be to undertake 
an approximation of a Tsotsil philosophy in order to 
reflect on the different perspectives that this philosophy 
takes and, thus, broaden our own sociocultural historical 
horizon. For this reason, and as we go, we will introduce 
certain concepts that will allow us to reflect on diverse 
philosophical categories, such as p’ij, p’ij o’ntonal, pasel, 
ich’el ta muk’ o na’el. 
P’IJ 
The concept of p’ij has several layers. We’ll mention just 
a few in what follows. To begin with, we should mention 
that p’ij refers to something that is found in its fullness, 
complete, and mature [íntegro, completo y maduro]. In one 
linguistic variation, the peoples of San Juan Chamula call 
it bij; however, both roots can be traced specifically to a 
numerical root in the tsetsal language referring to things 
or objects which are circular. Moreover, bij is the capacity 
of the subject to fulfill himself as subject, or a subject that 
has the necessary qualities to live in the community.1 This 
implies a moment in which the subject becomes complete, 
something that may not have much to do with the way in 
which this completeness comes about, but which is, rather, 
about an analogy between knowledge and the capacities 
of the subject, for instance, with dialogue, which has its 
beginning and its end, slikeb and slajeb,2 referring to a 
circling around a conversation. These two elements have 
to do with Mayan numbering practices. Furthermore, the 
person who is p’ij has knowledge, is wise, manages wisdom 
[sabiduría]; we could say that this person is a person who 
knows about life, a person with common knowledge. 
Outlines of what will eventually become knowledge are 
manifested in dreams (vaech); dreamers then project 
these outlines in conversation [plática] and coexistence as 
a form of sharing. Much of what these outlines become, 
these knowledges, are not going to be written in texts, 
but will remain at the level of dialogue, in the construction 
of possible worlds, in which dreams constitute a pre­
comprehension and pre-construction of reality and of 
the world; moreover, this is knowledge that must be put 
into practice—elders say that words have ch’ulel, they 
contribute to the constitution of subjectivity. 
Concepts for reality and constitution are but schemas 
or frameworks that subjects construct on an individual, 
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familial, and community basis and point to a complexity 
of interconnections, a complexity that has neither a 
center or a simple multiplicity of centers, but a species of 
interpenetration which is continuous and all encompassing. 
The concept of p’ij, vaechil transmits, to a certain extent, 
the idea of an epistemological rapture in the very same 
concept of knowledge. Preconstruction is what grounds 
the composition of the relationship of knowledges; what is 
given in it are the structural, symbolic, and temporal aspects 
that make possible the construction of the relationships of 
thought. 
Dreams (vaech) are an anticipation of what is to come; in 
this sense, through dreams the relationship is announced, 
which is like prophesy since through dreams the future 
configuration of life is made present and evident. Dreams 
are thus a medium about which one can learn and which 
can be shared, and having been shared can allow others to 
prepare; it is something real; it is not fictitious; it is as the 
prophesy of a future life. This is possible because actions 
lead to ends and motives in regards to that which one 
anticipates and in regards to why one anticipates. 
The conceptualization of doings (pasel) and of cultural 
horizons demonstrate a typology of schemes. Every 
conceptualization has within it certain symbolic forms, 
which are cultural processes that articulate experiences. 
Ultimately, it is the horizon of human labor that allows for 
the possibility of comprehending and narrating a world 
bridging two realities: one is the reality of dreams and 
the other is what is commonly thought as the real. Both 
parts make up living reality, and those knowledge schemes 
are what make possible our understanding of these two 
realities as unified, tied in the same knot. 
The configuration of that other reality which is dreaming 
(vaechil, meaning cricket sleep, from vay, to sleep, and chil, 
cricket) mirrors real action; in this way, dreaming provides 
an articulated temporal narrative that connects the reality 
of dreaming and the reality which is lived. Dreaming lends 
evidence to a possible world, and reality is where the 
result is executed in the form of schematic construction; 
the construction of the schema is the synthesis of both 
realities. Thus, a significant totality is generated in which 
events are interweaved into practice. This totality is made 
obvious in those elements of the schema that serve as 
points of narrative creation, which, in turn, evidences the 
encounter between word and communion. 
The events of both dimensions become facts and actions in 
the schema. Because of that schema, narratives relate those 
events that are foundational to the culture. This circularity is 
represented in the idea of the spiral or the snail [caracol], 
which is posited as a principle for chan, which refers to 
the idea of an end that appears as a beginning, insofar as 
chanubtasel-p’ijubtasel. This principle is rooted in the initial 
conditions that make it possible, and so the beginning 
appears as a recapitulation of an entire life or of an entire 
experience, just as a beginning, and that beginning can be 
the end of another stage. 
In that beginning there is a particular configuration of 
thought. Those two encounters, or knots, of knowledge 
generate a new seed wherein the beginning is what 
is given and established, but comes together with an 
innovation in thinking; that thinking is being itself. When 
we speak about a new seed, we refer to the creation of a 
narrative scheme or schema which is, on the one hand, a 
process of the creative imagination and, on the other hand, 
a historical process, an aspect of paradigms grounded 
on a community’s tradition. The construction of a schema 
for communal thought is product of the imagination, 
life, and praxis, in such a way that the schema presents 
a certain dynamism as a consequence of a socialcultural 
and historical deployment. Tradition consists in once again 
narrating an entire practice or an entire experience laid out 
in history and innovation; in this way, tradition, being itself 
an ontological truth, remains the same in spite of change 
and innovation through slikeb and slajeb. 
The experiences of dreams and of life are configured in 
dialogue; dreaming and living represent the duality of real 
world and possible world projected in narrative: here we 
have the construction of thinking. The narrator organizes a 
sense and, simultenously, reconfigures reality. This happens 
when the narrator takes as his point of departure a lived 
experience that he is familiar with or when he interprets a 
fact; interpretation forcefully summons the imaginary, which 
makes the individual represent within himself a specific 
form, in such a way that the narrator configures the context 
from his own schemes, generated from the experiences of 
his own life. As such, the construction of thought, through 
the word, and through communal education, are plotted 
as labor made possible by the unity of circumstance and 
subject. This is why narrative only comes alive in the act 
of sharing. To understand always implies interpretation, 
and all interpretation and application begins with a pre­
understanding. At work in understanding, there is always 
an idea of what one wants to understand, and what one 
wants to understand is rooted in the situation of the one 
who interprets; that is, I understand the other from my 
understanding of his horizon, and I understand the horizon 
of the other from an understanding of mine. 
P’IJIL O’NTONAL 
Sk’an chi jlo’ilaj xchi’uk ti kontontike is part of a profound 
reflection undertaken in order to understand oneself as 
subject, and it implies dialogue with one’s heart in order to 
know one’s self. Kaibetik sk’op ti ko’ntontike is to listen to 
the suggestions of the heart. As such, to think with one’s 
heart is important to Tsotsil culture. P’ijil jol o’nton refers 
to the intellect or the capacities of one’s head and heart, 
but the connection between thoughts and emotions has 
to do with the way of being tsotsil. Lek o’ntonal kerem 
refers to a child with a good heart and is also a synonym 
of learning. Jamal yo’nton refers to an open heart, that is, 
to the existence of a disposition to know or to learn. Sna’ 
yo’nton means that one’s heart knows, but also that one’s 
heart remembers. T’abesel ta o’ntonal, vulesel ta o’ntonal 
refers to a return to the heart. 
The heart is that which carries p’ijilal, that wisdom that 
distinguishes persons from other types of living beings; 
it must be developed by all individuals following . . . the 
directions of one’s life (or following the guidelines given by 
day of one’s birth). When a person fails to act in accordance 
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 with the directives of his p’ijilal, it is said that he has no 
heart, that he is incomplete (mu ts’akaluk), or, simply, that 
he has no head nor heart. 
The heart is the intermediary for the relation between 
the individual and the world. In this sense, we consider 
as fundamental that the person utilize her heart in the 
business of everyday, that is, that the person must analyze, 
reflect, and corroborate her social practices before making 
any decision. Thus it is said that the heart, in relation with 
the head (jol), fulfills an important role for the group to 
which one belongs because it allows individuals to think 
for themselves, that they understand their environment 
and their relations with others. The formation of the Tsotsil 
individual is constructed, moreover, on the basis of a vital 
principle, which is the heart in relation with the ch’ulel, that 
is, with his interior, his being, his heart, his center, and his 
nucleus. 
That vital principle which is the heart is perceived as a 
specific place for thought to take place, but also for the 
emotions, as is alo ti k’usi xchi ti avo’ntone (“say what your 
heart thinks or feels”), which is an expression of feelings, 
what identifies and knows your heart; on the basis of this 
expression, certain other feelings are identified which 
are derived from personal, familiar, communal, or social 
situations or problems. Ja’ ti k’usi chai ti avo’ntone (“what 
my heart feels”) and ja’ ti k’usi tsnop ti a vo’ntone (“what 
your heart thinks”) are expressions used to manifest the 
emotive state and certain types of feelings and sensations 
of p’ijilal. Moreover, the heart is where the cognitive, 
emotive, and sensational processes take place, those that 
express the experiences of the Tsotsil people in accordance 
with their own reality. 
It is clear that whoever educates must be aware of the 
proper way of understanding the world that surrounds him 
in order to be part of it, that is, to be p’ij in the heart of 
a culture or society. For that reason, preparing the youth 
means to allow them to take ownership of themselves, 
to have them be responsible in the culture, that they are 
capable of lending life to their word, that they are capable 
of self-criticism. They must listen to their parents and to 
the words left behind by their elders; that is, it is not about 
listening to words divinely dictated, but rather to those 
words spoken which are the product of actual experience 
and self reflection. In this way, children are educated so 
that they may be capable of dialogue with their heart, so 
that they may be owners of only one heart. 
There are three great imperatives related to one’s speaking 
with one’s heart. They are: 
•	 Lo’ilajan xchi’uk ti avo’ntone. 
•	 K’opojan xchi’uk ti avo’ntone. 
•	 Chi’no ta lo’il xchi’uk avo’nton. 
These imperatives constitute the manner in which one 
must educate and develop oneself in order to understand 
the word of the heart. Lo’ilajan xchi’uk ti avo’ntone means 
to dialogue with one’s heart; it is a way of talking with 
one’s heart. K’opojan is dialogue itself and ch’ino refers to 
bringing one’s heart to a conversation with others. When 
we speak of reflection, thought, dialogue, or ideas, we 
refer to a thinking from the heart, to that speaking with 
oneself, to being with oneself in the act of dialogue; this 
is why we speak of unfolding oneself, since that is the way 
to understanding. 
Analyzing each one of these concepts would take some 
time, since about each one of them a book could be 
written. But the central idea is that understanding each 
concept awakens the heart, as well as the individual’s 
social conscience. Each expression tells us how to behave 
in some determinate context—individual, familiar, or 
communal—and each word, each proclamation, aims to 
attach itself to thought and to the heart so that one is able 
to reflect the wisdom of totil- me’iletik, bankilal, jnitvanej, 
jam k’opetik, those who open dialogues. . . . 
All of this makes possible that the heart is not lost. The 
heart is forged by the word and the chanubtasel, p’ijubtasel, 
which is the only action capable of forming the human 
heart and of orienting it in accordance with the desires of 
the community, since only through chanubtasel, p’ijubtasel
does each man and each woman give meaning to their 
lives, a meaning that goes beyond the meaning given in 
everyday existence. Yut o’ntonal refers to a place within 
the heart, which is a type of sacred place for wisdom. The 
heart is characterized by its capacity to think and to live— 
what my heart says, ja’ ti k’usi chal ti ko’ntone. The heart 
has its word, it speaks its own tongue, in a murmur that is 
unintelligible but magnificent. . . . [W]hat the heart dictates 
is what words express so that words become but a part, 
a vibrant thing, rhythmic and sonorous that . . . refers to 
the soul and those feelings of which it speaks. There are 
words that violently strike and there are words that lovingly 
embrace, hard and terse words, some acidic, others sweet, 
others bitter, others poisonous. That is the way of the heart, 
and the word that is spoken is the profound ancestral word 
that is deposited in our heart. Previous words watch over 
us, they educate us, and in naming them the elements 
appear. Some condition us through time; others change 
from one episteme to another according to the expressions 
of our hearts, giving them the possibility to understand and 
name our world. 
Nicolas Bolom tells us, sk’an xch’ani jutuk ti ko’ntontike 
(to silence the heart is a primordial act) because the word 
is born from silence given that the intellect is able to feel 
non-verbally (ak’o snijan sba ti avo’ntone yu’un chchan). It 
thus appears that silence is really communicative when it 
is contrasted with speaking. As such the word that comes 
from the heart’s education is not lazy, idle, or empty, but it 
knows what it wants to say or express; it is consciousness 
and ch’ulel and it goes together with other human 
attitudes. Moreover, it is impassioned and rebellious since 
it is not written on paper but is read in the heart. We can 
ask ourselves why the words are so jealously guarded in 
the heart, and perhaps our answer will be that learning 
requires a perfect silence in order to speak; it is a means 
to return to the origin, to the first principle, to the slikeb 
of what is expressed. In the originary language, abstract 
ideas are frequently expressed through the use of the word 
heart (o’ntonal), as such, some fundamental existential 
expressions emanate from it. 
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OJTIKINEL IN RELATION WITH NA’EL 
Ojtikinel and na’el are verbs that have great significance 
in the Tsotsil language. The first means to be acquainted 
with [conocer]. If the child is acquainted with something, 
it is because he adopts a manner of being and knowing 
in which he can identity any other kind of knowing and 
how it applies to everyday life. That is, ojtikinel implies an 
approach to the real from a place of dynamic complexity; 
this is because the space is made up of a system of 
relations between multiple communal subjects. This is 
why the child must dutifully confront the equilibriums or 
disequilibriums between different faculties that make up 
the subject, giving importance to intuition and imagination, 
as well as will, over analytic and synthetic cognition and 
relating specialized cognition with cognition in general. 
The second verb, na’el, has to do with knowledge and 
memory. Na’el means to know, but it also means to be, 
knowing how to be, and knowing how to do. It suggests 
that whoever thinks must live in accordance with his 
context and is at the same time recalling knowledge. . . . 
This verb is never separated from ojtikinel. Both concepts 
relate and complement each other because when the child 
is acquainted with or knows, then he is becoming complete 
even if he lacks ch’ulel (consciousness). 
Appreciating acquaintance and knowledge, k’uxubinel ti 
ojtikinele xchi’uk ti sna’ele, is extremely important since 
it constitutes the genealogy (slikeb) of all that has been 
known and confronted. If these are not appreciated, this 
means that they do not form part of one’s thought, one’s 
practice, and one’s being in Tsotsil life. 
What has been said refers to the formative resources 
available to Tsotsil individuals as they seek to develop 
themselves in an integral fashion so as to adequately 
participate in their society. As such, elders (totil-me’iletik) 
propose various value concepts of great importance 
that determine the character and personality, signified 
by sna’el snopel, spasel, and, consequently, the form of 
comportment in society and with nature. These concepts 
or values are 
•	 J-abtel: a person with initiative, solidarity, 
economic power, and hard working. 
•	 P’ijilal: a person with wisdom, good thoughts, and 
respectful. 
•	 Jtak’ivanej, j-al mantal: a person with strength of 
mind and spirit, capable of addressing others with 
wisdom and philosophy. 
•	 Chanel: a person that learns new things daily. 
These four values, concepts, or principles are significant 
because they not only have to do with the comportment 
and behavior of human beings but also with nature. For the 
raising of children, different interrelated aspects of Tsotsil
culture intervene. These are k’el bail, k’an bail, tak’iel, as 
grounds of personal and social identity; ich’bail ta muk’ 
ta p’ijubtasel, which makes possible the transmission 
and generation of spiritual and religious cognitions; and 
k’otesbel yo’nton, ak’bel yil, as the forms themselves of 
education and formation, aspects that are developed in 
the process of socializating individuals into Tsotsil culture. 
The main instrument for the transmission of these values is 
language, which allows sharing the symbolic universes of 
culture itself. 
NOTES 
1.	 A subject who is responsible, that knows how to work, that has 
initiative, that has principles that accord with the context in which 
he finds himself, that has the reflexive capacity to participate in 
an assembly. In the case of women, that she knows how to sow, 
prepare meals . . . take care of fowl, garden, and knows how to 
care for the children, etc. 
2.	 Slikeb is the beginning, but it is not numerical. Rather, it is 
represented by the figure of a snail, a seed, or a flower. Each 
one of these elements is fundamental: the snail represents the 
beginning or the end, and in iconography is used in Maya’s 
numbering practices; the seed represents the birth of all being 
and the flower represents the beginning for the fruit or the seed. 
This means that Mayan thought is cyclical, but not infinite, as it 
is limited in its numbering to 1 to 20. Tsotsil thought is likewise 
organized into units of 20. 
Luis Villoro: Universal Mexican 
Philosopher 
Mario-Teodoro Ramírez 
Translated by Carlos Alberto Sánchez 
INTRODUCTION 
Luis Villoro, the most important philosophical figure of 
contemporary Mexico,1 was born on November 3, 1922, 
and died on March 5, 2014. He began his academic and 
intellectual activity in the late 1940s in the context of the 
impact produced by the Mexican Revolution of 1910 in all 
areas of national life. Along with other young philosophers— 
Leopoldo Zea, Emilio Uranga, Jorge Portilla—Villoro helped 
to found el grupo Hiperión, which sought to apply to the 
national situation the ideas of the European philosophical 
currents in vogue at the time, in particular, historicism and 
existentialism.2 Overall, the group set out to philosophically 
think the Mexican problem and produced, in its brief 
existence (1948–1952), some of the most significant 
essays in Mexican philosophy of the twentieth century, 
e.g., Emilio Uranga’s “Analysis of Mexican Being,”3 or 
the “Phenomenology of Relajo” by Jorge Portilla.4 Villoro 
published two books in this time:  Great Moments of 
the Indigenismo in Mexico (1950),5 and The Ideological 
Process of the Revolution of Independence of 1952,6 
which showed a sophisticated and original combination of 
philosophical talents and historical skill. Villoro is clear that 
the question about Mexican being should be answered on 
historical-critical grounds and not purely on conceptual or 
philosophical grounds or in a psychological or sociological 
manner. 
However, dissatisfied with certain derivations and 
nationalist/ideological questions opened up by Hyperion, 
Villoro refrains from these issues and sets out to seek, or 
better yet, build a philosophical conception appropriate to 
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his own worries and purposes. He thus undertakes some 
valuable reflections on Eastern philosophy, Husserlian 
phenomenology, modern philosophy (Descartes, in 
particular), analytical philosophy, Marxism, philosophy of 
culture, etc., which give him theoretical tools that allow 
him to work and contribute to issues in such diverse 
philosophical disciplines as philosophical anthropology, 
epistemology, the critique of ideology, ethics, political 
philosophy, philosophy of religion, and others. But beyond 
specific issues, trends, and doctrines, Villoro was and 
wanted to be primarily a philosopher, that is, someone who 
intended to think the totality of existence in its complexity 
and in its realization. He had the ability and interest to 
deal with universal themes, to dedicate the rigor that the 
philosophical discipline requires, and yet he also had 
the sensitivity to address the problems of his concrete 
historical and social reality, i.e., the Mexican reality. In the 
tension between the universal and the particular—a string 
that stretches across the entirety of twentieth century 
Mexican philosophy—Villoro was able to situate himself in 
the realm of the “concrete,” that is, the universal-individual 
or the particular-universal, where there was no denying 
any of these two poles. The task was not, for the Mexican 
philosopher, to simply find a “dialectical solution” to the 
universal-particular dilemma but, moreover, to know how 
to move intelligently and with sensitivity from one pole to 
another, from one dimension to another. 
The conception that Villoro deploys onto the relationship 
between culture and values better allows us to understand 
his notion of the meaning and place of philosophical 
practice (which is also a varlorative practice). As a matter 
of principle, regarding the nature of value, the Mexican 
philosopher questions both the universalist conception 
as well as the particularistic conception, that is, both the 
position that values are simply universal as well as the 
position that holds that values are relative to a context 
or are particular, historically and geographically situated 
in a world.7 For Villoro there is no direct apprehension 
of values, rather values are mediated by culture, by 
the specific cultural world in which the human subject 
unfolds and properly exists.8 This because, and we can 
propose this by our account, values are not concepts 
or formal definitions that can be grasped by a purely 
intellectual process. Values are qualities that are said of 
objects, events, or people and are understood—valued 
[valorados]—in the context of a specific socio-cultural 
world. However, this does not mean that values as such 
are something “particular,” that every culture has its own 
distinctive set of values, and thus that the cultures are 
incomparable or incommensurable in their axiological 
conceptions. What is unique is the way we apprehend and 
understand values, not values as such. Now, if there is no 
direct apprehension of values, then there is no “universal 
culture,” which is the most questionable assumption of 
axiological universalism leading to that vice that we call 
ethnocentrism, and, more precisely, “Eurocentrism” as the 
assumption that European culture (and Western-modern, in 
general) is the “universal culture,” the culture that does not 
need a culturally mediated apprehension of values—which 
is simply a contradiction and, therefore, allows itself the 
right to impose its conception to other cultures.  According 
to Villoro, “axiological universalism” is an ideology that 
legitimates domination. But “value relativism” is not the 
solution, as it disarms cultures of their critical-rational 
capacity: that is, if all cultures are “equal,” then we have no 
basis to criticize the dominant, hegemonic, or ethnocentric 
cultures. 
For our philosopher both are true: values are indeed 
universal, but there is no universal culture; each particular 
culture is a way of apprehending, understanding, 
and realizing universal values. Thus, there is no 
incommensurability between cultures, which are all, in 
their complex diversity, pointing one way or another to 
those values. To the extent that every culture is capable of 
apprehending values (universal values), every culture has 
the ability to transcend its closed particularity and be open 
to the Other, to separate it. Certainly, a culture can deny 
that openness and stay in a self-affirmation of identity, but 
this means precisely that culture refuses universal values, 
i.e., the value. A culture thus ends up denying itself, ceases 
to be, properly, culture. This implies, and Villoro holds this 
to be the case, that the essential dimension of what we 
call “culture” consists of evaluative possibilities (autonomy, 
authenticity, meaning, effectiveness9). Each culture is a way 
of valuing, or making values: justice, freedom, equality, 
dignity, solidarity, truth, beauty, etc., and, simultaneously, 
values are nothing and signify nothing—they have no 
worth—but only to the extent in which they are realized, in 
which they are brought to bear on the living space of their 
social-practical application. 
We can now define the Villorian conception of philosophical 
activity.10 We can say that for him there is no universal 
philosophy but merely a particular access which culturally 
mediates the philosophical universal. But it is just not 
about making philosophy which is “particular” philosophy, 
identified with a specific context and peculiar features, 
alienated from the major themes of universal thought. But 
neither is it about denying any reference to the particular, 
identified only with an abstract and general philosophical 
activity, which is the same for everyone. What our 
particularity determines is the way we treat philosophical 
universality: the order of importance of the topics, the 
meaning or nuance we give them, the consequences we 
draw from our treatment, and the context to which we 
direct our theoretical and philosophical contributions. We 
bow to the universal while not denying our uniqueness but 
deepening ourselves in it, radically thinking its conditions 
and essential features, and noting that these are not 
contrary or too distant to our ends or to what every thinking 
human being posits for herself anywhere in the world. 
For Villoro, to philosophize is to build that space of 
“concreteness” where the universal and the particular, far 
from opposing each other, resonate with each other and 
configure a thinking that, as universal, continues to show 
signs of socio-cultural particularity, and being particular 
continues to open horizons and vectors of universal 
significance. This mutual determination, this movement 
of double reversibility, is what constitutes the form of 
philosophical practice that Villoro exercises and somehow 
constitutes a reference or even a model for philosophers in 
Mexico and elsewhere. 
SPRING 2017 | VOLUME 16  | NUMBER 2 PAGE 25 
APA NEWSLETTER  |  HISPANIC/LATINO ISSUES IN PHILOSOPHY
 
   
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
On the basis of this relationship between universality and 
particularity, we can now explain what we consider the 
three basic philosophical contributions of Luis Villoro: 1) 
the epistemological contribution, as a theory of the plurality 
of knowledge; 2) the ethical contribution as a political 
philosophy of the community from the experience of the 
indigenous peoples of Mexico; and 3) the metaphysical 
or ontological contribution, as anticipation of current 
philosophical realism, both a new and old philosophical 
and universal perspective. 
1. THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTION 
As we said a moment ago, Villoro conceives philosophy 
as an essential and integral activity. His activity as a 
philosopher is not exhausted by any philosophical discipline 
or assignment to any current or doctrine of thought.  Villoro 
is not thinking theories or philosophies but reality as such 
and the problems it poses. Philosophy is not an end in itself 
but a means to understand what there is and how to act 
and live in the world. Philosophy has a telos that points 
beyond itself, is not thinking for the sake of pure thinking. 
From this perspective we must locate the important theory 
of knowledge that our philosopher develops and presents 
in his book Creer, Saber, Conocer.11 We want to make 
clear, first, that Villoro’s aim is not to construct a theory of 
knowledge per se, but it must be understood in the context 
of questions posed by his overall philosophical quest. The 
problem Villoro raises as the basis for his project, and 
considering the Mexican context of his reflection, is whether 
we can have an adequate theory of the relationship between 
knowledge and practical-social life, or, more generally, 
between thought and life, between reason and praxis. That 
is, can we have a rational practical or philosophically 
oriented life? Can knowledge help us live better, allowing 
us to overcome violence, domination, injustice? This point 
is what allows us to observe that the specific contribution 
to the theory of knowledge that Villoro makes is found in 
the third epistemological category he analyzes, “conocer,” 
i.e., personal knowledge and wisdom.12 Somehow Villoro 
believes that the tradition of the theory of knowledge has 
forgotten or ignored that third possibility of knowledge, 
focusing solely on the analysis of the first two: belief 
(belief, ideology) and knowledge (valid belief, science), 
and forcing us to choose between one or the other: social 
practice can only be either ideological, based on a more 
or less valid ideology, although insufficiently rational, or 
scientific, founded on a scientific and technical know-how, 
on the knowledge of experts and a purely methodical-
objective rationality. None of these options is acceptable 
to Villoro, as both have had questionable and disastrous 
consequences in the world of practical life. 
It’s worth noting those definitions that our philosopher 
provides for those epistemic terms that give title to his 
book. He understands “creer” (belief) as a disposition 
of the subject to behave in a certain way under the 
assumption that something is the case. This assumption, 
“the belief,” can be justified on motives or reasons that 
the subject can claim. The motives are purely subjective 
motives for belief and can refer to desires, interests, 
conveniences, emotional states, or convictions which 
are religions or of some other kind; negatively put, these 
are conditions of the belief that have no objective and 
rational basis. On the contrary, the reasons for a belief are 
the arguments that an individual can give in order to hold 
it. As such, the belief becomes a “saber” (knowing) when 
the reasons that support it have a character of objectively 
and are methodically supported. The reasons affirm that 
the object of belief is the case and, therefore, that it exists 
regardless of what the particular subject creates. Villoro 
states that the “objectively reasonable reasons” are those 
that a particular epistemic community assumes as accepted 
according to the epistemological criteria governing the 
community. In this way we can explain the intersubjective 
character that, for Villoro, scientific knowledge possesses. 
As for the definition of “conocer,” it is important to note 
the fundamental difference between it and creer (belief) 
and saber (knowing). While the latter epistemic functions 
refer to the world of beliefs, “el conocer” refers to a 
reality as it is apprehended through personal and lived 
experience. “Conocer” is to have an experience of the 
thing or situation; it is knowledge about the entity and 
its real qualities. In Spanish, there is a big difference 
between saying “conozco a Carlos” [“I know Carlos”] and 
saying “I believe Carlos is michoacano” or “I know Carlos is 
michoacano.” The first formula expresses knowledge that 
can be justified on real experiences or data or evidence to 
realize that this experience is real. The second formula is 
based on grounds or probable reasons, more or less certain 
(other beliefs, certain assumptions), while the third formula 
is based on reasons that are considered objectively valid 
(his birth certificate, his identity card, or other objective) 
tests.  It can even be the case that it can express the third 
but not the first formula; for example, I can say “sé quién 
es Donald Trump pero no lo conozco”—”I know who Donald 
Trump is but I do not know him” (or want to know him). Thus, 
it is clear that “conocer” (familiar knowledge) constitutes a 
kind of knowledge which is original and irreducible to the 
other types. 
“Conocer” refers to all the forms of knowledge we 
have of reality or of the human world through those 
experiences that cannot be reduced either to ideology 
or science. This includes not only personal knowledge, 
but also interpersonal knowledge, aesthetic knowledge, 
emotional knowledge (religion as a form of experience 
and not as ideological doctrine), and ethical-axiological 
knowledge (i.e., understanding of values). According to 
Villoro, “conocer” can be formed into a set of consistent 
concepts and shared communally, which is what is 
designated by the term “wisdom,” which is not mere belief 
or mere knowledge, but a way of being and living. Says our 
philosopher, “A scientist is not necessarily a wise man. For a 
sage it is not one who applies theories, but applies lessons 
learned from life experiences.”13 
Now, in the same way that ideology can refer, albeit vaguely 
or extrinsically, to a certain group or social class, and that 
scientific knowledge is held in the rules and procedures 
of an epistemic community, wisdom refers to what the 
Mexican philosopher calls “sapiential communities,” 
or better yet, we could name them on our own terms 
as “cultural communities,” i.e., a set of subjects that 
concretely and experientially share in certain knoweldges, 
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experiences, values, ways of acting and living, of feeling, 
etc. Thus we have, for example, a community of artists, 
or teachers, a professional community or a religious 
community; finally, an ethnic community or one that exists 
in a particular geographical area and shares a common 
tradition of ideas, values, and social practices, such as the 
indigenous peoples of Mexico. 
For Villoro, knowledge (sabiduría) constitutes a form of 
self-knowledge (conocimiento) and also possesses a kind 
of specific rationality that lies in the notion that beliefs 
(convictions) of knowledge (sabiduría) are founded on 
real praxis or, more precisely, on the consistency between 
the subject that believes and thinks and that which that 
subjects makes or lives. Although this consistency may 
be the subject of theoretical justification, it is usually a 
practical “justification”; that is, it is shown in action, in the 
work or behavior of an individual. Naturally, this requires 
the existence of other individuals who can testify to that 
justification. 
Finally, with respect to modern epistemological discussion, 
Villoro proposes an alternative: to recover and observe the 
value of wisdom (sabiduría) as a specific and fundamental 
form of human knowledge and the exercise of human 
reason. Against those visions that reduce reason to 
its scientific form and which leave for practical life the 
dominion of non-rational, ideological forms of thinking, the 
Mexican philosopher finds that the possibility for human life 
lies elsewhere, in another place, in another dimension: it 
lies in a rationality that is rooted, vitalistic and practical, and 
communitarian. In general, Villoro sees wisdom (sabiduria), 
as a form of thinking that is different from both science and 
ideology, the alternative for social and human life.14 
2. THE ETHICAL CONTRIBUTION 
A turn or change of perspective occurs in the intellectual 
trajectory of Villoro sometime in the early 1990s. This shift 
consisted, in line with the same preoccupation with praxis 
and the vital existential dimension, in his passing from an 
epistemological critique of ideology and a general proposal 
for the living of life under rational-epistemic parameters 
to a political critique of ideology and the more specific 
proposal of ethically grounding social praxis. In the same 
way that we find in philosophical thought and wisdom 
an alternative to the ideology-science dichotomy, in the 
practical field we can find an alternative to the dichotomy 
between ideological morality and rationalist utopianism: 
that is precisely the alternative of ethical thinking. This 
ethical-political trajectory is best reflected in Villoro’s 
Power and Value.15 
In that book our philosopher deals with various issues of 
ethical theory and political philosophy; both are treated 
under the hypothesis that both issues should be closely 
linked. To think ethically in political terms and to think 
politically in ethical terms is the proposition that allows us 
to overcome the impasses of both a pure ethical theory (and 
its inveterate idealism) and a pure political theory (and its 
incorrigible pragmatism). Between the ideological idealism 
of established morality and the immorality of a policy 
subject to power one finds, according to Villoro, a double 
mediation between ethics and politics: an ethics that is not 
as such if it does not position itself in the matter of its own 
socially effective realization and a politics that is a sign of 
a human failure if it does not allow itself to be guided by 
ethical values. Ethics—that is, a life according to basic and 
universal values—is only plausible if it arises in the social 
context and in the struggle for the common good, that is, if 
it knows to link itself with a commitment to political praxis, 
to rationally coordinated social action. At the same time, 
political life suffering from a lack of ethical guidelines is 
reduced to a mere mechanism for the reproduction of social 
order and loses all critical and emancipatory possibility. For 
Villoro there is no purely “individual” ethics, but rather all 
ethical commitment involves a commitment to others. And 
there is no political or relevant collective social action 
without the assumption of values and ethical principles. 
Starting from the question into the possibility of an ethically 
oriented social life, according to the universal values of 
freedom, autonomy, equality, and, particularly, as the value 
of solidarity justice, Villoro engages in a critical analysis of 
the forms of socio-political organization or state in which 
they have existed. He discusses three types: the State for 
Order, the State for Freedom, and the State for Equality.16 The 
first is the form that prioritizes the value of order (security, 
survival of the social group, etc.) and operates under the 
principle of the subjection of individuals and social groups 
to an autonomous power that supposedly guarantees 
the smooth running of society. The second type of state, 
which is a product of modern revolutions, aims to ensure 
individual rights and the exercise of freedoms; it sets limits 
to authoritarian forms of the State for Order. The third type 
of state, which actually is a complement of the second, is 
the state that seeks to guarantee social or collective rights 
under the purpose of achieving greater and fairer equality 
and adequate conditions of life for all its members. 
Villoro considers the three types of states as having been 
unable to create a just, free, harmonious, and creative social 
life. This is because the nature of the state is to become a 
structure of domination on the social body, i.e., to abide 
by politics that always subordinates values to power, social 
life to the interests of class or group. In general, Villoro 
questions the various modern political ideologies. Neither 
liberalism nor socialism, neither nationalism nor social 
democratic approaches are attractive, not only in relation 
to the particular conditions of Mexico but also in terms of a 
universal conception of justice. Therefore, Villoro proposed 
to interpret and assume the perspective of indigenous 
groups in our country, particularly those of Chiapas 
indigenous groups organized around the EZLN and that 
came to the world’s attention in 1994. 
The indigenous political philosophy (Zapatista) that Villoro 
reclaims is structured around the following principles or 
normative ideals: a) the construction of social life guided 
by ethical principles, where power is subjected to value; b) 
the practice of direct and participatory democracy, which 
monitors and prevents that political representation 
alienates itself from the community by positioning itself 
as a separate power “over” the community (this is the 
Zapatista principle of “govern by obeying”); c) the freely 
assumed priority (an area on which the critical spirit of 
Villoro is highlighted) of the community over the individual, 
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namely, the questioning of the forms of egoistic and anti­
social individualism that characterizes modernity, but also 
of authoritative and taxing forms of social integration; d) 
the recognition of the values of cultural tradition as a source 
of meaning for contemporary life, a respectful relationship 
with nature, and a holistic and decentered conception of 
the sacred as a meaning for life in its totality, as universal 
communion of all beings.17 
Hence, Villoro finds in the indigenous world an alternative, 
a political-cultural-ethical model, with which to address 
disorders and insufficiencies of modern society. We must 
clarify two important points: 1) the Mexican philosopher 
also argues that we should not abandon the valuable 
achievements of modernity, as the scientific spirit when 
it is well understood, that is, without dogmatism and 
reductionism, the defense of freedom and the value of 
Individual freedom (without the excesses of selfish, and 
even nihilistic, individualism); 2) also Villoro is aware 
that the ethical and political indigenous model cannot 
be simplistically extrapolated to modern life: rather, it’s 
about taking its principles as guidelines concerning social 
and political transformation in our own time. In any event, 
what we must change is our perception and appreciation 
of indigenous cultures under a generously multicultural 
perspective. Beyond the recognition of the rights of 
indigenous communities, we must also, and perhaps 
this is the most important point, be willing to learn from 
indigenous thought and practice, to see what they can 
teach us. 
3. THE METAPHYSICAL CONTRIBUTION 
Along with the great philosophical issues to which we have 
referred, i.e., the epistemological, ethical, and political, 
Villoro was also interested in the ultimate questions about 
the meaning of existence, the Self, the Holy, the Divine, 
etc.18 He expressed this interest in a somewhat lateral and 
discreet way, which he framed within the broad outlines 
of twentieth-century thought—analytic philosophy, 
phenomenology, Marxism. Our author was aware that his 
theological-philosophical, metaphysical, and ontological 
interests had no place (and would not be well regarded) 
under those theoretical paradigms, which all coincide 
in rejecting metaphysics and assuming some form of 
atheism. However, the recent crisis in the theoretical 
paradigms noted above as well as the emergence of new 
philosophical conceptions proposed so far in this century, 
as the ontological turn of speculative realism, can retrieve 
and assess the metaphysical intuitions of Villoro and allows 
us to give them a fair and essential place in the whole of 
his thought. 
First, we must recall the ontological realism that Villoro 
maintained as the ultimate thesis in his theory of 
knowledge. Against epistemologies of a formalist pragmatic 
kind, that is, against the assumption that the analysis of 
the processes of knowledge exhausts any ontological 
question or, in other words, against the assumption that 
epistemology eliminates the need for Ontology, Villoro 
points in Creer, saber, conocer that the assumption 
that there is a reality independent of the subject and its 
frameworks of knowledge is a condition for the possibility 
of objectivity and the truth of knowledge. “The existence 
of a reality independent of the subject,” explains Villoro, 
“onto which judgments can be adapted, is the only rational 
explanation, both of the coincidence of the objective 
justifications of a plurality of subjects, as the progress of 
knowledge itself.”19 
However, hesitant to return to any metaphysical thought 
in the classic mode (as dogmatic and unfounded), 
Villoro cannot find the theoretical means to support his 
assertion of the primacy of reality and the possibility of 
an ontology. In his last essay “On Truth,”20 he stretches, 
we believe fruitlessly, phenomenological conceptions 
and linguistic pragmatics to seek to justify the classical 
definition of truth as “correspondence” or a reference 
to a trans-subjective reality. Regardless of the issues of 
method, it is clear that our philosopher refuses to believe 
any “idealistic” position, but at the same time never settles 
on overly restrictive guidelines of analytic philosophy and 
ideological scientism, so that his reflection in some way 
points to speculative realism (which also opposes both the 
idealism and the empiricist or positivist realism) which has 
recently been proposed by various thinkers such as Quentin 
Meillassoux, Graham Harman, and Markus Gabriel.21 
Clearly, Villoro is aware that an ontological-realism stance
is needed in order to escape the skeptical and relativistic
implications of modern and postmodernthought.Inthe search
for this stance he found the mystical path as the possibility of
accessing a completely other reality, absolutely other, with
respect to the human subject and all its determinants and
relativities. Thus, in his writings on philosophy of religion,
Villoro advocates a holistic conception of the divine as
silent and irreducible to any conceptualization or religious-
ideological or intellectual fixation. Although he does not
take a definitive position on the issue, it is understood that
there is no rational way to the Divine, only a mystical way. We
believe this position can be problematized. Similarly to
Wittgenstein, the Mexican philosopher also finds a way to
“talk about that which cannot be spoken.” His conception
of the Divine is grounded, in fact, in a phenomenological-
rational reflection rather than a purely emotional posture,
one that is simply irrational. In his beautiful text “The
Blue Mosque,”22 Villoro presents more than a theoretical
discussion about God and the sacred but a description of a
mystical experience in the first person, that is, the experience
that Villoro himself says he had while visiting the famous
church in Istanbul. Now, this does not rule out the possibility
of a metaphysical discourse (ontological-rational) about the
Divine and, in general, on the existence of an absolute reality
beyond human determinations. This possibility of a critical-
rational discourse about God (or the idea of God) is what
new realism has proposed in this century, particularly in the
version of the French thinker Quentin Meillassoux. What this
author proposes is the possibility of a (logical-speculative)
rational demonstration of the existence of a reality-in-itself
independently of consciousness and human life, that is, one
that is absolute.23 This route would not be inconsistent with
the defense of rationality Villoro assumes in his philosophy,
though it would certainly force the opening of the discussion
about the possibility of metaphysical, ontological, and
speculative thought in the sphere of Mexican philosophy
and Latin American philosophy in general. 
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In some ways, the epistemological position of analytic 
philosophy or the ideological-political currents in Latin 
American thought generally have demonstrated their 
insufficiency and incapacity to respond to the real 
necessities of life and thought in our countries, where 
philosophy normally lies between the form of thought 
which is totally alien to our concrete realities or a form of 
thought strongly committed to these realities but grounded 
on strong ideological positions which are at times simplistic 
and merely schematic. The general lack of interest in Latin 
American philosophers, in their accounts of the basic 
philosophical questions of metaphysics or ontology, is 
revealed as an inability of our philosophies to rationally 
justify an understanding of reality and an orientation for 
reliable and effectively binding praxis in our communities. 
We believe, finally, that while our philosophy does not come 
to deal directly with basic metaphysical questions, the 
project of an autonomous and creative Mexican and Latin 
American philosophy will remain pending, in regards to its 
effective implementation. The line opened by the rigorous, 
consistent, and systematic philosophical elaboration of 
Villoro can be taken up and developed, certainly, under 
new contexts and new provisions, and according to new 
theoretical and practical-social challenges. 
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In Search of the Philosophical Impulse: 
Zea and the Greeks 
Django Runyan 
SAN JOSE STATE UNIVERSITY
The preoccupation with identity in the philosophy of 
Leopoldo Zea is part of a greater set of concerns in Latin 
American philosophy in general. However, the issues that 
Zea raises and the emergence of Latin American philosophy 
give way to questions about philosophy as a whole. In this 
paper I will examine some of the issues that Zea opens 
up in relation to the larger philosophical project. One 
particular passage from Zea will instigate this investigation 
and serve as a call to go back to the origins of Western 
philosophy. Throughout what follows I will examine the very 
possibility of philosophy in light of Zea’s observations, and 
I will attempt to show how Zea is closer to the spirit of the 
original philosophical impulse that drove the Greeks and, 
from there, examine the possibilities and questions this 
raises for the future of philosophy based on Zea’s thought. 
Philosophy begins with a question—the authentic 
philosophical question begins in wonderment; any 
theory or treatise will always be an extension of this 
initial questioning. And so we have reached an era where 
perhaps our new, authentic sense of wonderment will be 
in relation to this question, “What is philosophy?”—What 
are the key terms of this investigation?—wonderment, 
question, authenticity, and philosophy. The nature of 
this paper is such that the definition of these terms are 
preliminary and that we remember that we want them to 
remain preliminary—tools for opening what we search for, 
attempting to remain humble about hasty assertions. 
So I begin in brief with these definitions, of which I 
acknowledge their malleability: 
•	 Wonderment – The space that opens before the 
question, the sense of awe at one’s own ignorance. 
•	 Question – The notion of a question is also tied to 
authenticity, but part of the question of the question 
is this: Do I remember to keep the question? That is, 
does the question remain pressing, urgent, or is it 
easily satisfied or clouded out by existing theories? 
SPRING 2017 | VOLUME 16  | NUMBER 2 	 PAGE 29 
APA NEWSLETTER  |  HISPANIC/LATINO ISSUES IN PHILOSOPHY
 
 
Does the history of philosophy sometimes prevent 
the emergence of original questioning? 
•	 Authenticity – Here I define what is authentic, 
as that expression which is truly one’s own, 
with the understanding of all conditioning and 
circumstances that influence what is one’s own. 
•	 Philosophy – philosophy will be, for now, intimately 
related to these other terms; perhaps for now, we 
will say that it is a search for wisdom that begins 
from the knowledge of the lack of that wisdom. 
With these terms loosely established, I hope to come to a 
deeper understanding of them through the investigation 
that follows. 
In one of Zea’s earliest articles, he concerns himself with 
the identity of Latin American culture and Latin American 
philosophy. In a key passage in this article, Zea’s affirmation 
of Latin American philosophy reveals a unique insight 
into what drives the philosophical impulse. Zea says that 
for Latin American philosophy to exist, it needs a Latin 
American culture from which to derive its content. So, 
Latin American philosophy will exist if we can affirm Latin 
American culture. But he goes on to say, “the formulation 
and attempt to solve this problem, apart from the affirmative 
or negative character of the answer, are already Latin 
American philosophy, since they are an attempt to answer 
affirmatively or negatively a Latin American question.”1 
What is exciting about Zea’s idea is that in attempting to 
ground philosophy in culture, he is actually grounding 
philosophy first, and grounding it universally. He reveals 
that the very method of questioning brings philosophy into 
existence. Here it is not yet philosophy based on tradition; 
it is philosophy as an essential human concern. Zea does 
not go on to clarify this idea precisely, but it brings many 
questions about the nature of philosophy to the foreground. 
First, there is a novelty to this expression; Zea writes as 
if he were the first person to discover himself doing 
philosophy. He can’t deny that it is philosophy because 
he is asking a philosophical question, a question about 
identity. It is the unique historical point in which Zea and 
Latin American philosophy exist that reveals a question 
that is fundamentally essential, that has an urgency and 
authenticity to it that at the same time stands to remind 
the larger philosophical enterprise of the importance of 
the question. In a sense, Zea is showing himself and his 
predecessors to be in the tradition of those pre-Socratics 
who had reached an impasse in their inquiry that could 
not be addressed by myth alone. These first philosophers 
began on totally new ground, from a place of wonder, as 
Aristotle famously said of them, “It is owing to their wonder 
that men both now begin and at first began to philosophize. 
. . . And a man who is puzzled and wonders thinks himself 
ignorant . . . therefore since they philosophized in order 
to escape from ignorance, evidently they pursued science 
in order to know . . .” (Arist. Met. 1.2,982b10-20).2 Aristotle 
here says that “men both now begin and at first began to 
philosophize . . .” 
What makes Zea unique in this regard? I argue that the 
spirit of Zea’s questioning is closer to that initial impulse of 
the pre-Socratics, that it has a similar urgency, spontaneity, 
and newness to it. While, obviously, the starting points 
of concern for the pre-Socratics and Latin American 
philosophy are different, the spirit of their beginnings have 
strong similarities. Although the Greeks already had a rich 
history, there was no written precedence for philosophy, 
for these questions that initially centered on cosmology. 
For Latin American philosophy, as Zea portrays it, the crisis 
in European culture, to which Latin American culture had 
always been so entangled, now found itself in a completely 
new situation. This situation, of no longer being able to rely 
on European culture while at the same time not having a 
firm identity without it, made the task of philosophizing 
more authentically attached to the questions it was asking. 
So in this way the question itself, while not resolving the 
issue of identity nonetheless reveals an identity. In stopping 
to appreciate that the questioning is itself philosophy, Zea 
is giving a piece to Latin American identity: to be Latin 
American will be, at some level, to be intimately engaged 
with this question of identity. All of our key terms have 
come into play and been expanded by Zea’s thought. 
For Aristotle, the pre-Socratics were able to be open to these 
new philosophical ideas, to this sense of wonder, because 
they were able to be at leisure.3 For Zea, the circumstance 
for wonderment arises from crisis. In both cases something 
of the old cultural guideposts begs to be shed so that the 
emerging questions can find light. In both cases the old is 
not destroyed but assimilated. This sense of wonderment 
seeks independence but must acknowledge the ground 
on which it stands—the circumstances of its arising. Thus, 
Xenophanes can now look to the existing cultural norms 
established by the mythological poets and say, “Homer 
and Hesiod have attributed to the gods all things that are 
blameworthy and disgraceful for men: stealing, committing 
adultery, deceiving each other [F 17],” and propose a new 
possibility, “One God, greatest among gods and men, not 
at all like to mortals in body nor in thought [F 35].”4 This new 
independent thought takes stock of the circumstances and 
yet boldly attempts a new and independent proposition. 
For Zea, a similar approach arises in dealing with the 
influence of Europe and the possibility of a Latin American 
identity, the cultural framework of Latin America is, for Zea, 
inherited from Europe, and he says, 
To become disengaged from it would be to 
become disengaged from the heart of our 
personality. We can no more deny that culture than 
we can deny our parents. And just as we have a 
personality that makes us distinct from our parents 
without having to deny them, we should also be 
able to have a cultural personality without having 
to deny the culture of which we are children. To be 
aware of our true relations with European culture 
eliminates our sense of inferiority and gives us 
instead a sense of responsibility. This is the feeling 
that animates the Latin American man today. He 
feels that he has “come of age,” and, as any other 
man who reaches maturity, he acknowledges that 
he has a past that he does not need to deny, just 
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as no one is ashamed of having a childhood. The 
Latin American man knows himself to be the heir 
of Western culture and now demands a place in it.5 
Thus, having seen the importance of assimilating European 
culture, Zea can assert his new proposition about Latin 
American philosophy in its particular circumstances and 
as part of the larger philosophical project. Latin American 
philosophy will contribute to the philosophical issues 
of its own culture while at the same time contributing to 
the universal issues of European philosophy the issues of 
“being, knowledge, space, time, God, life, death, etc.”6 
So, just as the unique circumstances of the Pre-Socratics 
allowed for a plurality of contributions as to the workings 
of the Universe and was born out of this sense of wonder, 
so too do these remarkable ideas of Zea’s propose a future 
wherein a plurality of cultures that have at once assimilated 
and outgrown the dominant philosophies might renew 
philosophy itself and restore philosophy as an essentially 
universally human impulse. Before I pursue the implications 
for the future of philosophy based on Zea’s insights, I want 
to continue with this comparison to the Greek tradition and 
look at how Zea defines philosophy and how philosophy 
came to be defined in practice by Socrates. 
In their respective approaches to philosophy, there are two 
ideas that link Zea with Socrates. These are the concepts of 
“lack” and of “search,” which I will return to after broadly 
laying out Zea’s conception of philosophy. In Cultural 
Identity and Social Liberation in Latin American Thought,
Ofelia Schutte summarizes Zea’s conception of philosophy. 
Philosophy is, for Zea, the highest expression and the 
foundation for culture. Philosophy serves the purpose of 
supplying lasting meaning to the lives of human beings 
given the constantly changing circumstances of everyday 
life. Where the varied expressions of culture attempt 
to supply meaning in a given social situation, for Zea, 
Schutte says, “philosophy represents the highest level of 
this attempt because it tries to offer not only an enduring 
but a universal representation of the meaning of human 
existence. Through philosophy a culture acquires a type of 
self-consciousness, that is to say, philosophy is the most 
significant cultural instrument through which an individual 
or a people can acquire self-knowledge.”7 Philosophy 
will be that which gives meaning to the historical person 
who is always changing in the struggles of her own 
circumstances.
Philosophy, in short, pushes beyond the current moment 
to provide something lasting. Schutte continues: “Zea may 
be interpreted to mean that where there is a lack of ideals 
that give meaning to life beyond the mere ‘living for the 
day,’ the conditions for culture (as well as for philosophy) 
are lacking.”8 
The ideas of the philosopher, no matter how abstract, are 
meant to serve everyday reality. With each ensuing crisis 
of cultural values, philosophy stands ready to fill the need 
for new values. Medieval philosophy yielded revelation 
to modernity and reason, and the crisis in Europe, Zea 
believes, will force reason to yield to new values also. But 
philosophy will always be grounded in the particular, and 
claims to universality will have to contend with this fact. 
But Zea believes that Western reason “has tried to affirm 
itself in abstraction from this cultural mark.”9 Universality 
will happen historically, it will be arrived at by a collective 
accounting of “particular perspectives.”10 What Schutte’s 
summary highlights is the problem of contemporary 
philosophy, a problem of hegemony. 
What I argue, in contrasting Zea’s views with the Greeks, is 
that there was a greater plurality of views and of discourse 
in the Greek era than we tend to recognize and that in 
keeping with Zea’s conception we ought to remember that, 
as abstract as our Greek philosophers may have been, it 
was always with an eye to bringing those ideas back to a 
grounding of ethics and public life. As it has been said a 
million times over, for the Greeks, philosophy was first and 
foremost a way of life. Furthermore, I would suggest that 
it is not the Greeks who are responsible for the hegemony 
that philosophy finds itself in today; they were merely the 
source that was exploited. 
The Greeks did exactly what Zea asks of philosophy: where 
there was a lack of ideas to supply the culture with enduring 
meaning, the philosophers came to the fore and gave rich 
ideas which, at least on the ethical level, we are still hard 
pressed to contend with today in an era that sees a rise in 
the study of Aristotelian virtue ethics and is only beginning 
to revamp the ethical theories of Stoicism. We can see Zea’s 
concept of creating new value when the cosmological views 
of the pre-Socratics would be found useful but lacking as 
Plato and Socrates give way to “the ethical turn,” and just 
when philosophy had begun to become too “theoretical,” 
the Roman era makes an even stronger turn in the practical 
direction with the Stoics and the Pyhrronian Skeptics. 
Returning to the theme of “lack” and “search,” what Zea 
has been showing us all along is that philosophy begins 
from this sense of lack. The crisis in European culture and 
the question of Latin America’s cultural and philosophical 
identity reveal a “lack,” an emptiness which creates the 
aforementioned wonderment, the conditions for seeking a 
solution. Philosophy, then, begins when this wonderment 
is addressed by a question, and this is the “search.” In 
Zea’s description it will be the continuing “search” for 
giving meaning to the human conditions and addressing 
the need for new values in times of social crisis. And what 
about Socrates? 
Beginning with Socrates’ portrayal in the Apology, we come 
back to one of the most oft repeated stories in philosophy, 
Socrates’ search for the wisest man in Athens. Here we 
can see Zea’s conception of philosophy played out in the 
individual. Being told by Chaerephon that the Oracle at 
Delphi has proclaimed Socrates the wisest man in Athens, 
Socrates is brought to this wonderment we are investigating 
and searches the city only to find that all those who proclaim 
knowledge do not really know what they claim. Socrates is 
thrown back on himself and proclaims in relationship to his 
interlocutors, he thinks he knows something when he does 
not, whereas when I do not know, neither do I think I know; 
so I am likely to be wiser than he to this small extent, that 
I do not think I know what I do not know” (Plato, Apology
21d-e).11 
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Now, I know we have all heard this story a thousand
times, but it bears repeating here as we try to discover
both what is unique about the spirit of Zea’s questioning
and in appreciating the very nature of an authentic
philosophical question. Here Socrates might help us in
registering what can make this impulse authentic, and it
is in his appreciation of his own “lack.” This “lack” is what
will instigate him to harass his fellow citizens and engage
them in philosophy. Part of the goal of this paper is to
remove Greek philosophy from its assumed position as
the source of our current hegemonic philosophical system.
Part of doing that is to be reminded of the lucidity of Greek
thought. The fact is that Plato’s dialogues do not typically
end with concrete assertions but rather in aporia, where
the very process of questioning is always highlighted
above and beyond any proposed theory. This fits well
with Zea’s notion of particular historical perspectives
coming together to form agreed upon universality. Plato
does not demand allegiance in his dialogues but rather
searches for universals that might apply to human needs.
Most of the Socratic dialogues pursue a particular virtue
but never pin down a specific definition of that virtue.
Instead, we are led to a greater appreciation of pursuing
the “search.” Where Socrates gives us a universal, it is in a
return to appreciating the question of which he seems to
be the only one not to lose sight of—the question itself,
that we should pursue it with vigor, this is universal for
Socrates. Heidegger uses Socrates when declaring that
our most thought-provoking thought is that “we are still
not thinking,” and that what gives us food for thought is
at the same time drawing away from us, which somehow
makes it near to us, and he says, 
Once we are so related to what withdraws, we are 
drawing into what withdraws, into the enigmatic 
and therefore mutable nearness of its appeal. 
Whenever man is properly drawing that way, he 
is thinking—even though he may still be far away 
from what withdraws, even though the withdrawal 
may remain as veiled as ever. All through his life 
and right into his death, Socrates did nothing else 
than place himself into this draft, this current, and 
maintain himself in it. This is why he is the purest 
thinker of the West. This is why he wrote nothing. For 
anyone who begins to write out of thoughtfulness 
must inevitably be like those people who run to 
seek refuge from any draft too strong for them. An 
as yet hidden history still keeps the secret why all 
great Western thinkers after Socrates, with all their 
greatness, had to be such fugitives.12 
Heidegger’s mysterious quote might here help in this 
exploration of an authentic philosophical question. If I read 
him correctly, I think Heidegger’s interpretation of Socrates 
shows a man who feels and appreciates this “lack” to such 
a degree that even resorting to the written word is a retreat, 
a refuge from the philosophical “search.” And in the search 
for cultural identity Zea, in relation to this question, has 
revealed both the difficulty and the necessity of staying with 
this question. It seems, for Zea, to be a call that cannot be 
ignored. The “lack” and the “search” are maintained all the 
way through. I have thus far examined Zea and the origins 
of the philosophical impulse, but what can we gleam from 
him for the future of philosophy and the pressing question 
that faces us today: What is philosophy? 
We have touched on the issue of hegemony in philosophy, 
and this issue becomes apparent when we look at the debate 
between Zea and the Peruvian philosopher Augusto Salazar 
Bondy. Bondy will draw some fundamentally opposed ideas 
about Latin American philosophy in contrast to Zea. Where 
Zea finds the use of poetry, maxims, aphorisms, etc., in 
the history of Western philosophy to be legitimate forms 
of philosophical discourse, Bondy, trained in the analytic 
tradition, believes that philosophy is a technical and 
specialized field which should not be confused with poetry 
or literature. Bondy does not believe that Latin America has 
produced a significant philosophy and that the cause of 
this is imperialism. For Bondy, philosophy should be “of a 
cultural product expressing the life of the community in a 
rational form.”13 
Culture is connected to communities, and a culture can be 
either genuinely authentic or defective. An underdeveloped 
culture will not completely respond to the needs of its 
community. What marks a culture as defective is when 
it wrongly appreciates inauthentic works as authentic 
philosophy. 
He uses three criteria for authenticity: originality, 
authenticity, and peculiarity. In accord with this criteria, 
any work that is repetitive, imitative, or peculiar will be 
inauthentic. So, for Bondy, since the history of Latin 
American philosophy meets the criteria of inauthentic, it is 
defective. We see again the connection between cultural 
identity and the possibility of a Latin American philosophy: 
because Latin America is an alienated culture, it lacks 
identity; because it lacks an authentic cultural identity, it 
cannot produce a genuine philosophy. 
Bondy proposes a “philosophy of liberation” as the way 
towards an authentic Latin American philosophy. In order 
for Latin American and Third World countries to produce 
their own philosophy, they have to break free from 
underdevelopment and domination. This new philosophy 
will begin from this place of liberation.14 
Bondy has added to the conversation of Latin American 
identity and philosophy and put forth some issues that 
cannot be ignored. What Zea has offered us is a new way 
of thinking about what philosophy can be from where we 
are standing. The question that seems hard to avoid with 
Bondy is this question of the hegemony of philosophy 
and his entrenchment within the hegemony. In all that 
came before this section, we have been searching for the 
authentic philosophical impulse. In bringing the Greeks 
into this picture, the aim has been to see if we can unearth 
what made this philosophy possible in the first place. The 
Greeks, like the Chinese and Indian philosophers of the 
ancient world, existed in a historical time and place, and 
in that place they felt a “lack”; this “lack” itself brought 
philosophy into being. Why should the contemporary 
philosopher or a philosopher such as Zea be deprived 
of philosophy when philosophy has never needed ideal 
circumstances for its existence but, rather, has always 
thrived precisely in the recognition of what it is lacking? 
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The lack could be whatever is pertinent to the philosopher 
and his circumstances; for the pre-Socratics, it was the lack 
of understanding of the Universe, for Plato and Socrates it 
was the recognition of the lack of wisdom that lead to the 
search for it, and for Zea, it is the lack of a coherent cultural 
identity that drives his “search.” 
The notion that philosophy must adhere to strict principles 
of a profession and skill that Bondy wants to push does 
several things: one, it removes philosophy from the public 
and keeps it locked in academia, which betrays the notion 
of the philosophical impulse; it delays and therefore 
denies human beings existing in the world—right here, 
today—the possibility of philosophy until some ideal state 
has been reached. The hegemony of philosophy begins 
when a history of philosophy becomes a doctrine of how 
philosophy ought to be applied and thereby denies fresh 
voices and new thought. 
I did not return to the origins of philosophy in the spirit 
of nostalgia, but to see if we might unearth what made 
philosophy new, when it was new. By contrast, this 
might be exactly what is standing in the way of a future 
philosophy or even a “now” philosophy: the search for an 
authentic question is being drowned by an adherence to 
philosophical doctrine that rather demands interesting 
reactions to pre-existing ideas. This should not mean that 
we be rid of the past but that we assimilate it and build 
from our own unique perspective and questions. 
The idea of contrasting Zea’s philosophy with Greek 
philosophy comes from the following: 
[Those who question whether there has been any 
philosophy in Latin America] forget that in the 
history of philosophy they want to turn into a model 
[of philosophizing] . . . [one may find] not only the 
systems of Plato and Aristotle but the poems of 
Parmenides, the maxims of Marcus Aurelius, the 
thoughts of Epicurus, Pascal, and many others. In 
short, there are forms of philosophizing that are 
expressed just as much in ordered systems as in a 
maxim, a poem, an essay, a play, or a novel.15 
It is interesting that but for Pascal, all of Zea’s examples of 
the plurality of philosophical approaches come from the 
Greeks, from the very beginning of philosophy. In taking 
Zea’s approach beyond Latin America, we can wonder if the 
hope it gives to this discipline is to prepare it for the inevitable 
loosening of the rigidity of the current hegemonic position. 
If it can prepare us to better appreciate philosophers from 
other nations, our own banished philosophers of the recent 
past, it might cause us to reflect on the possibility that the 
adherence to this hegemonic philosophy has colonized 
the colonizer. The notion of Western philosophy done in a 
particular manner has deprived philosophy of new insights, 
of its own independent identity, and of the value of other 
insights. What I hope to have added to this conversation 
is an appreciation of an authentic philosophical impulse 
and the need to retain that impulse in our philosophical 
thinking. 
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